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When aggregating information from a group of agents, accepting the pieces of information
shared by all agents is a natural requirement. In this paper, we investigate such a unanimity
condition in the setting of propositional merging. We discuss two interpretations of
the unanimity condition. We show that the ﬁrst interpretation is captured by existing
postulates for merging. But the second interpretation is not, and this leads to the
introduction of a new disjunction postulate (Disj). It turns out that existing operators
satisfying (Disj) do not perform well with respect to the standard criteria used to evaluate
merging operators: logical properties, computational complexity and strategy-proofness.
To ﬁll this gap, we introduce two new families of propositional merging operators, quota
operators and Gmin operators, which satisfy (Disj), and achieve interesting trade-offs with
respect to the logical, computational, and strategy-proofness criteria.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Merging operators aim at deﬁning the beliefs (resp. goals) of a group of agents from their individual beliefs (resp. goals)
and some integrity constraints. The merging problem in the propositional setting has been considered in many works,
both from the artiﬁcial intelligence community and the database community (see e.g. [10,26,20,21,3,4,18]). What makes the
problem diﬃcult is that agents often have conﬂicting pieces of information.
Propositional merging is close to important issues considered in social choice theory [1,23,2], especially vote and pref-
erence aggregation. Indeed, each agent can be viewed as a voter and her belief/goal base can be considered as a compact
representation of a preference relation, which is such that the models of the base are the most preferred alternatives and
the countermodels are strictly less preferred than the models. The output of the aggregation step (namely, the merged base)
consists of the most preferred alternatives for the group. The set of models of the integrity constraint plays the role of an
agenda (a set of available alternatives). In propositional merging, the (IC) postulates [18], complemented with the majority
postulate (Maj) are used as criteria to characterize several meaningful families of operators, like the IC merging operators
(those satisfying the (IC) postulates) and the IC majority operators (the IC operators satisfying (Maj)).
Now, there are several requirements that aggregation methods (including merging techniques and voting rules) are ex-
pected to satisfy, and which have been identiﬁed as conditions for voting rules and/or rationality postulates for merging.
Among them is unanimity, asking to accept at the group level the pieces of information shared by all agents. When voting
rules are concerned, it simply means that if candidate a is preferred to candidate b by each voter, then candidate a has to
be preferred to candidate b for the group.
✩ This paper is an extended and revised version of a paper that appeared in the Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (IJCAI’05), 2005, pp. 424–429.
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The ﬁrst one consists in viewing each base as the set of its models, representing the most preferred alternatives of the
associated agent. This interpretation of the unanimity principle amounts to keeping as models of the merged base each
model of the integrity constraint which satisﬁes all the bases. This property is ensured by every merging operator satisfying
postulate (IC2) (one of the (IC) postulates), which is strictly more demanding ((IC2) requires that, when non-empty, the set
of models of the merged base consists precisely of the models of the integrity constraint satisfying all the bases).
In the other possible interpretation, when each base is viewed as the set of its logical consequences (i.e., the deductive
closure of the base), the unanimity condition states that the set of consequences shared by all agents, must hold for the
group. The formal characterization of this condition is what we call the disjunction postulate (Disj) for merging since it
requires to select the models of the merged base among the models of the agents’ bases (unless there is no model of the
integrity constraint among them).
(Disj) is expected in some belief merging scenarios, especially when it is assumed that one of the agents is right (her
beliefs hold in the actual world). For instance, consider a group of physicians, each of them reporting a prescription for the
same patient; it could be harmful for the patient to “mix” the individual prescriptions in order to obtain a prescription at
the group level; requiring (Disj) prevents from such trade-offs between prescriptions. On the other hand, (Disj) should be
avoided when a form of compromise between agents is desired. For instance, suppose that John and Mary want to spend
their evening together, but while John would like to go to the sushi bar, then watch a movie, Mary would prefer to eat a
risotto, then go to the theater. Requiring (Disj) to be satisﬁed would make some compromises (like going to the sushi bar
then to the theater) out of reach.
In the following, we consider the family of disjunctive merging operators, i.e., those satisfying (Disj). At the interpretation
level, we show that (Disj) corresponds to an interpretation of the unanimity condition for countermodels: if all agents agree
that some interpretations are countermodels, then the group must also agree on it. We also show that (Disj) is independent
of the (IC) postulates.
Now, existing merging operators satisfying (Disj) are typically formula-based merging operators, i.e., operators which
select subsets of the union of the given bases. Such operators do not perform well with respect to the standard criteria
used to evaluate merging operators, namely logical properties, computational complexity and strategy-proofness. To ﬁll this
gap, we introduce two new families of propositional merging operators, quota operators and Gmin operators, which satisfy
(Disj), and achieve interesting trade-offs with respect to the logical, computational, and strategy-proofness criteria.
Quota operators rely on a simple idea: any possible world is viewed as a model of the merged base when it satisﬁes
“suﬃciently many” bases from the given proﬁle (the collection of agents’ bases). “Suﬃciently many” means either “at least k”
(any integer, absolute quota), or “at least k%” (a relative quota), or ﬁnally “as many as possible”, and each interpretation gives
rise to a speciﬁc merging operator. The full family of quota operators is obtained by letting the quota vary. We show that
quota operators exhibit good logical properties, have low computational complexity and are strategy-proof.
Each Gmin operator is parameterized by a pseudo-distance, and the family is obtained by letting it vary. Each Gmin
operator reﬁnes all quota operators, has good logical properties, is mildly complex (i.e., the inference problem is at the ﬁrst
level of the polynomial hierarchy) but is not strategy-proof in the general case.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section gives some formal preliminaries. Section 3 discusses the main criteria
for evaluating merging operators, and presents some expected logical properties for a merging operator. In Section 4, we
formalize the unanimity condition in the propositional merging setting. In Section 5, quota operators are deﬁned and their
properties are presented. In Section 6, we deﬁne kmax , which is the operator obtained when optimizing the value of
the quota. In Section 7, Gmin operators are deﬁned and their properties are presented. Finally, we conclude this paper in
Section 8. Proofs are reported in Appendix A.
2. Formal preliminaries
We consider a propositional language L deﬁned from a ﬁnite set of propositional variables P and the usual connectives,
including  (the Boolean constant true) and ⊥ (the Boolean constant false).
An interpretation (or world) is a total function from P to {0,1}, denoted by a bit vector whenever a strict total order
on P is speciﬁed. The set of all interpretations is noted W . An interpretation ω is a model of a formula φ ∈ L if and only
if it makes it true in the usual truth functional way. | denotes logical entailment and ≡ denotes logical equivalence. [φ]
denotes the set of models of formula φ, i.e., [φ] = {ω ∈ W | ω | φ}. Conversely, let M be a set of interpretations, ϕM denotes
the logical formula (unique up to logical equivalence) whose models are M .
A base K denotes the set of beliefs/goals of an agent, it is a ﬁnite and consistent set of propositional formulas, interpreted
conjunctively. Unless stated otherwise, we identify K with the conjunction of its elements.
A proﬁle E represents a group of n agents involved in the merging process. It is a non-empty multi-set of bases E =
{K1, . . . , Kn}, hence different agents are allowed to exhibit identical bases. We denote by ∧ E the conjunction of bases of E ,
i.e.,
∧
E = K1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kn , and similarly ∨ E is the disjunction of the bases of E , i.e., ∨ E = K1 ∨ · · · ∨ Kn . A proﬁle E is said
to be consistent if and only if
∧
E is consistent. Multi-set union is noted unionsq, and multi-set containment relation is noted .
The cardinality of a ﬁnite set (or a ﬁnite multi-set) A is noted #(A). We say that two proﬁles are equivalent, noted E1 ≡ E2,
if there exists a bijection f from E1 to E2 such that for every K ∈ E1, K and f (K ) are logically equivalent.
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constraints μ consist of a consistent formula the merged base has to satisfy (it may represent some physical laws, some
norms, etc.).
A preorder  on W is a reﬂexive and transitive relation. A preorder on W is total if ∀ω,ω′ ∈ W , ω ω′ or ω′ ω. Let
 be a preorder on W , we deﬁne the corresponding strict ordering < on W as ω < ω′ if and only if ω  ω′ and ω′  ω,
and the induced equivalence relation (indifference)  on W is given by ω  ω′ if and only if ωω′ and ω′ ω. We write
ω ∈min(A,) if and only if ω ∈ A and there does not exist ω′ ∈ A s.t. ω′ < ω.
We assume the reader familiar with the complexity classes P, NP and coNP and we consider the following classes located
at the ﬁrst level of the polynomial hierarchy (see [25] for an introduction to complexity theory):
• BH(2) (also known as DP) is the class of all languages L such that L = L1 ∩ L2, where L1 is in NP and L2 in coNP. BH(3)
is the class of all languages L such that L = L1 ∪ L2, where L1 is in BH(2) and L2 in NP. coBH(3) is the class of all
languages L such that L ∈ BH(3).
• p2 = PNP is the class of all languages that can be recognized in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine
equipped with an NP oracle, where an NP oracle solves whatever instance of a problem from NP in unit time.
• Θ p2 = p2 [O(logn)] is the class of all languages that can be recognized in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing
machine using a number of calls to an NP oracle bounded by a logarithmic function of the size of the input.
3. Expected properties of merging operators
Many merging operators have been deﬁned so far. A distinction between model-based operators [26,18,16], which select
some interpretations that are the “closest” to the bases encoding the beliefs/goals of agents, and formula-based ones [3,4,15],
which pick some formulas in the union of the bases is often made [16].
3.1. How to choose a “good” merging operator?
Each existing merging operator is more or less suited to the various merging scenarios which can be considered. Sub-
sequently, when facing an application for which merging is required, a ﬁrst diﬃculty is the choice of a speciﬁc merging
operator. Among the criteria which can be used to make a valuable choice, are the following ones:
Rationality: A main requirement for adhering to a merging method is that it offers the expected properties of what intu-
itively “merging” means. This calls for sets of rationality postulates and this issue has been addressed in several
papers [26,20,18]. In the following, we focus on the rationality postulates given in [18], because they extend other
proposals.
Computational complexity: When one looks for a merging operator for an autonomous multi-agent system, a natural
requirement is computational eﬃciency. In the worst case, merging is not a computationally easy task [16], and
query answering typically lies at the ﬁrst or even the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Computationally
easier operators can be obviously preferred to more complex ones. Identifying the computational complexity of
the query answering problem for an operator, and restrictions under which it decreases, are important issues to
be investigated.
Strategy-proofness: It is usually expected for merging that agents report truthfully their beliefs/goals. For many applica-
tions, this assumption can easily be made, in particular when the agents have limited reasoning abilities. However,
when rational agents with full inference power are considered, such an assumption must be questioned: agents
can be tempted to misreport their beliefs/goals in order to achieve a better merging result from their point of
view. Strategy-proof operators must be preferred in such a case.
How much existing merging operators ﬁt the criteria above has been investigated in a number of previous papers. As
to rationality, one can look at [26,20,21,15,18,16]. As to computational complexity, see [16,24], and for a study of strategy-
proofness of many merging operators see [13] (see also [22] for a related study concerning merging operators for ordinal
conditional functions).
The main result of [13] is that strategy-proofness is hard to achieve for merging operators. This result is not so surprising
since, in social choice theory, an impossibility theorem (the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem), states that this strategy-
proofness task is not achievable, in the general case, when one aggregates preferences [14,27,23]. In [13], it is shown that
even under very restrictive assumptions, most of the propositional merging operators from the literature are not strategy-
proof.
In the light of these results, it appears that while no merging operator is better than any other operator with re-
spect to all the above criteria, model-based operators [26,18,16] are typically better than formula-based operators [3,4,
15]. To be more precise, while operators from both families are typically not strategy-proof, model-based operators are of-
ten computationally easier (inference is typically Θ p2 -complete or 
p
2 -complete) than formula-based ones (inference can be
Π
p
2 -hard) [16]. In addition, model-based operators also typically satisfy more rationality postulates than formula-based ones
(see [18,15]).
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their disjunctive behaviour.1 A main contribution of this paper is to show that disjunctive merging operators which are
much better performers than formula-based ones with respect to the three criteria exist. Especially, we point out two new
families of such disjunctive merging operators.
3.2. Logical properties
The following set of logical properties for merging operators has been presented and discussed in [17,18]:
Deﬁnition 1 (IC merging operators). Let  be a propositional merging operator, E , E1, E2 be proﬁles, K1, K2 be bases and
μ, μ1, μ2 be integrity constraints. Let n be an integer.  is an IC merging operator if and only if it satisﬁes the following
postulates:
(IC0) μ(E) | μ,
(IC1) If μ is consistent, then μ(E) is consistent,
(IC2) If
∧
E is consistent with μ, then μ(E) ≡∧ E ∧ μ,
(IC3) If E1 ≡ E2 and μ1 ≡ μ2, then μ1 (E1) ≡ μ2 (E2),
(IC4) If K1 | μ and K2 | μ, then μ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 is consistent if and only if μ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 is consistent,
(IC5) μ(E1) ∧ μ(E2) | μ(E1 unionsq E2),
(IC6) If μ(E1) ∧ μ(E2) is consistent, then μ(E1 unionsq E2) | μ(E1) ∧ μ(E2),
(IC7) μ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | μ1∧μ2 (E),
(IC8) If μ1 (E) ∧ μ2 is consistent, then μ1∧μ2 (E) | μ1 (E) ∧ μ2.
An IC merging operator is said to be an IC majority operator if it satisﬁes (Maj)
(Maj) ∃n μ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | μ(E2).
The intuitive meaning of the properties is the following: (IC0) ensures that the merged base satisﬁes the integrity con-
straints. (IC1) states that, if the integrity constraints are consistent, then the merged base has to be consistent. (IC2) states
that if possible, the merged base is simply the conjunction of the bases with the integrity constraints. (IC3) is the principle
of irrelevance of syntax: the result of merging has to depend only on the expressed opinions and not on their syntactical
presentation. (IC4) is a fairness postulate meaning that when one merges two bases, one should not give preference to one
of them (if the merged base is consistent with one of them, it has to be consistent with the other one). It is a symmetry
condition, which aims to rule out operators which give priority to one of the bases. (IC5) expresses the following idea:
if proﬁles are viewed as expressing the beliefs/goals of the agents of a group, then if E1 (corresponding to a ﬁrst group)
compromises on a set of alternatives which A belongs to, and E2 (corresponding to a second group) compromises on an-
other set of alternatives which contains A too, then A has to be in the chosen alternatives if we join the two groups. (IC5)
and (IC6) together state that if one could ﬁnd two subgroups of agents which agree on at least one alternative, then the
merged base must be exactly those alternatives the two groups agree on. (IC7) and (IC8) state that the notion of closeness
is well-behaved, i.e., an alternative that is preferred among the possible alternatives ([μ1]), will remain preferred if one
restricts the possible choices ([μ1 ∧ μ2]). The majority postulate (Maj) just means that repeating suﬃciently many times a
subgroup of agents allows it to impose its view to the whole group.
See [17,19] for more explanations about these postulates and the behaviour of the corresponding operators.
4. Unanimity and disjunction
As explained in the introduction, the unanimity condition for voting rules requires that if a candidate is chosen by
every voter from a group then the group should also choose her. In the merging setting, at the interpretation level, available
alternatives are the models of the integrity constraint; accordingly, such a Unanimity condition on Models can be formalized
by
(UnaM) If ω | μ and ∀K ∈ E , ω | K , then ω | μ(E).
It is easy to show that every merging operator satisfying (IC2) also satisﬁes (UnaM).
Now, each propositional base can also be viewed as the (conjunctive) set of its logical consequences. This view gives rise
to another interpretation of the Unanimity condition, at the Formula level this time.
1 See Section 4 for a discussion on disjunction.
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Roughly, this condition states that every formula which is a logical consequence of each base of the given proﬁle E
should also be a logical consequence of the merged base. Nevertheless, since one wants to preserve the basic postulates
(IC0) and (IC1),2 we require this condition only when there exists at least one base K of E that is consistent with μ. (UnaF)
turns out to be equivalent to the following (and simpler) (Disj) postulate:
(Disj) If
∨
E is consistent with μ, then μ(E) |∨ E .
This property clearly states that each model of the merged base must be chosen among the models of the disjunction of
the bases, whenever this disjunction is consistent with the constraints.
Proposition 1. (UnaF) and (Disj) are equivalent.
Let us call disjunctive operators the operators satisfying the condition (Disj).
Interestingly, at the interpretation level, this property is also equivalent to the following (UnaC) postulate (Unanimity for
Countermodels):
(UnaC) If
∨
E is consistent with μ, then if ∀K ∈ E , ω | K , then ω | μ(E).
The rationale for (UnaC) is to discard from the models of the merged base all the interpretations which are discarded by
each agent of the group, which is a natural requirement.
Proposition 2. (UnaC) and (Disj) are equivalent.
The statements of (UnaM) and (UnaC) have quite a similar structure, but (UnaM) expresses a unanimity on models
whereas (UnaC) is concerned with unanimity on countermodels.
Let us now extend the representation theorem for IC merging operators given in [19] to the case of disjunctive merging
operators. Let us ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of syncretic assignments from [19]:
Deﬁnition 2 (Syncretic assignments). A syncretic assignment is a total function ϕ mapping each proﬁle E to a relation E over
interpretations, such that for any ω,ω′ ∈ W :
(1) If ω |∧ E and ω′ |∧ E , then ω E ω′ ,
(2) If ω |∧ E and ω′ |∧ E , then ω <E ω′ ,
(3) If E1 ≡ E2, then E1=E2 ,
(4) ∀ω ∈ W , if ω | K , then ∃ω′ | K ′ s.t. ω′ {K ,K ′} ω,
(5) If ωE1 ω′ and ωE2 ω′ , then ωE1unionsqE2 ω′ ,
(6) If ω <E1 ω
′ and ωE2 ω′ , then ω <E1unionsqE2 ω′ .
Let us now introduce a condition which characterizes the disjunctive behaviour:
Deﬁnition 3 (Disjunctive syncretic assignments). A disjunctive syncretic assignment is a syncretic assignment satisfying the
following condition:
(d) If ω |∨ E and ω′ |∨ E , then ω <E ω′ .
We derived a representation theorem for disjunctive merging operators:
Proposition 3.  is a disjunctive IC merging operator (i.e., it satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8) and (Disj)) if and only if there exists a disjunctive
syncretic assignment which maps each proﬁle E to a total preorder E such that [μ(E)] =min([μ],E).
It turns out that the disjunction property (Disj) is not satisﬁed by many IC merging operators [18], since most of them
allow for “generating” some new beliefs/goals from the ones in the bases of the proﬁle (some interpretations which do not
satisfy any of the bases can be chosen as models of the merged base). This is justiﬁed by the fact that merging operators
are sometimes expected to ﬁnd trade-offs between the agent’s views. When this behaviour is unexpected, formula-based
merging operators – which satisfy (Disj) – can be used, but such operators:
2 From an aggregation point of view, (IC0) means that the chosen alternatives for the group are in the set of available alternatives and (IC1) means that
there exist chosen alternatives for the group as soon as the set of available alternatives is not empty.
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• are often hard from a computational point of view [16],
• and are not strategy-proof [13].
Now, at a ﬁrst glance, a straightforward idea to deﬁne disjunctive operators is to enforce the disjunction condition in the
integrity constraints of (non-disjunctive) operators. To be more precise:
Deﬁnition 4 (d). Let  be any propositional merging operator. The “disjunctive” merging operator d induced by  is
deﬁned by: ∀E,μ, dμ(E) ≡ (∨ E)∧μ(E).
However, there is no guarantee that the resulting operator is valuable from a logical point of view. Indeed, even if one
starts with an IC merging operator  (i.e., an operator satisfying all the (IC) postulates), one cannot ensure in the general
case that d is also an IC operator:
Proposition 4. Let  be an IC merging operator. Then d satisﬁes (IC0), (IC2), (IC3), (IC4), (IC7), (IC8) and (Disj). None of (IC1),
(IC5), (IC6) is satisﬁed in the general case.
So an important issue is to determine the impact of the new disjunction postulate on the existing families of operators.
The key question concerns the independence of the postulate w.r.t. existing ones. The results presented in the following
show that (Disj) is independent of the IC postulates in the sense that some IC operators (like dD ,Σ [19]) satisﬁes it, while
other IC operators (like dH ,Σ [19]) do not. Since dD ,Σ and dH ,Σ also satisfy the majority postulate, (Disj) enables to
split the family of IC majority operators into two non-empty subsets.
While (Disj) is compatible with the (IC) postulates, only few existing operators satisfy both conditions, especially because
only few operators satisfy (Disj); indeed, the standard model-based merging operators based on the Hamming distance
between interpretations [19] satisfy all the (IC) postulates but do not satisfy (Disj). Contrastingly, as explained previously,
formula-based merging operators from the literature are typically disjunctive ones, but they do not satisfy all the (IC)
postulates, they have a high complexity and they are not strategy-proof.
This calls for new disjunctive merging operators satisfying as many (IC) postulates as possible, and more generally,
performing better than formula-based operators with respect to the complexity and strategy-proofness criteria. In the fol-
lowing we ﬁll this gap by providing two families of new disjunctive merging operators which offer interesting alternatives
to formula-based operators in this respect.
5. Quota operators
A ﬁrst family consists of quota operators. Quota operators rely on a simple idea: any possible world is viewed as a model
of the merged base when it satisﬁes “suﬃciently many” bases from the given proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 5 (Quota operators). Let k be an integer 0, E = {K1, . . . , Kn} be a proﬁle, and μ be an integrity constraint. The
k-quota merging operator, noted k , is deﬁned in a model-theoretic way as:[kμ(E)]= { {ω ∈ [μ] | ∀Ki ∈ E ω | Ki} if non-empty,{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} otherwise.
Essentially, this deﬁnition states that the models of the result of the k-quota merging of proﬁle E under constraints μ
are the models of μ which satisfy at least k bases of E . When there is no conﬂict for the merging, i.e.,
∧
E∧μ is consistent,
the result of the merging is simply the conjunction of the bases with the integrity constraint.
Example 1. Consider a set P consisting of three atoms and a proﬁle E = {K1, K2, K3, K4} with [K1] = {100,001,010,101},
[K2] = {001,101}, [K3] = {100,000,011}, and [K4] = {111}, and the integrity constraints [μ] = W \ {010,011}.
Using quota operators, we get:
• [1μ(E)] = {000,001,100,101,111}: the models of the merged base are the models of μ which satisfy at least one
base.
• [2μ(E)] = {001,100,101}: the models of the merged base are the models of μ which satisfy at least two bases.
• [3μ(E)] = ∅: no model of μ satisﬁes at least three bases.
Fixing the quota to 0 or 1 leads to operators close to operators known in the literature. Thus, 0 gives the conjunction
of the bases with the constraints μ when consistent and μ otherwise. It is called full meet merging operator in [17]. This
operator leads to giving up all the agents’ beliefs as soon as they are conﬂicting. 1 gives the conjunction of the bases with
μ when consistent and the conjunction of μ with the disjunction of the bases otherwise; it is close to the basic merging
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aggregation function [16]. The only difference is that 1 gives an inconsistent result when the disjunction of the bases is
not consistent with μ, whilst the basic merging operator gives μ in this case.
Here is an equivalent syntactical characterization of each quota operator kμ(E) (i.e., the result is directly given by a
formula) that is obtained from subsets of E .3 Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the following notation:
nk=
{
C ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} ∣∣ #(C) = k}.
Then the following proposition gives a characterization of quota operators:
Proposition 5. Let k be an integer 0, E = {K1, . . . , Kn} be a proﬁle, and μ be an integrity constraint,
kμ(E) ≡
{∧
E ∧ μ if consistent,
(
∨
C∈nk(
∧
j∈C K j)) ∧ μ otherwise.
Interestingly, the size of the formula equivalent to [kμ(E)] given by Proposition 5 is polynomial in |E| + |μ|. Hence,
merged bases can be easily compiled as propositional formulas, i.e., turned into an equivalent propositional formula in
polynomial space (and even in polynomial time in this case). This property is not shared by many merging operators.
Indeed, there are strong connections between belief merging operators (under integrity constraints) and belief revision
operators, and it has been shown in [9] some (non-)compilability results for several belief revision operators.
5.1. Logical properties
Quota merging operators exhibit good logical properties:
Proposition 6. k operators satisfy (IC0), (IC2), (IC3), (IC4), (IC5), (IC7), (IC8), and (Disj) if k > 0. They do not satisfy (IC1), (IC6)
and (Maj) in the general case.
Only two properties of IC merging operators are not satisﬁed: (IC1) since the result of the quota merging can be incon-
sistent (see Example 1), and (IC6).
Note that it is possible to make (IC1) satisﬁed by requiring that, when no interpretation reaches the quota (i.e., satisﬁes
at least k bases), the merged base is equivalent to the integrity constraints. However, this alternative deﬁnition leads to
operators which satisfy neither (Disj) nor the important postulate (IC5), so we did not consider this option (we do not want
to expand further on it here, for the sake of brevity; see nevertheless Proposition 22 in Appendix A).
The other postulate which is not satisﬁed by quota operators, (IC6), is one of the postulates that no formula-based
operators satisfy [15]. From this point of view, quota operators have a similar behaviour to that of formula-based operators.
Two other interesting properties can be deﬁned for characterizing more precisely quota operators; the ﬁrst one is a
weakening of (Maj):
(Wmaj) If μ(E2) is consistent, then ∃n μ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∧ μ(E2) is consistent.
That (Wmaj) is satisﬁed by quota operators can be easily explained by the fact that duplicating some bases from a given
proﬁle can only weaken the resulting merged base when quota operators are considered.
The second property shows the prominence of the largest maximal consistent subsets of the proﬁle with respect to the
merged base. We ﬁrst need to deﬁne maximal consistent subsets:
Deﬁnition 6 (Maximal consistent subsets).
maxconsμ(E) =
{
M
∣∣∣ M  E, ∧M ∧ μ is consistent, and if M  M ′  E, then ∧M ′ ∧ μ is not consistent}.
We are now ready to deﬁne the cardinality property (Card):
(Card) If M1,M2 ∈maxconsμ(E), #(M1) #(M2), and μ(E) ∧ M1 is consistent, then μ(E) ∧ M2 is consistent.
This property can be seen as a kind of majority property. The maximal consistent subsets of bases are the largest (with
respect to multi-set inclusion) conﬂict-free sets of formulas from the bases, and, as such, they play a fundamental role
in many approaches to reasoning under inconsistency (see e.g. [8,7,6]). (Card) states that the largest sets (with respect to
3 “Subsets” is to be considered here with respect to multi-set containment; “Sub multi-sets” would be more correct but it sounds too bad.
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subset M1, it has to be consistent with every maximal consistent subset M2 which is larger than M1.
Unlike (Wmaj), the cardinality postulate (Card) is not a weakening of (Maj), even under the (IC) conditions, but it is
independent of it. Thus, in the following, we show that the kmax operator (cf. Section 6) is an IC majority merging operator
satisfying (Card), and that Gmin operators (cf. Section 7) are IC operators which do not satisfy any of (Wmaj) or (Card) in
the general case. On the other hand, the IC majority merging operator dH ,Σ [19] does not satisfy (Card). Indeed, consider
the following counter-example: P = {a,b}, E = {K1, K2, K3} with K1 = {¬a}, K2 = {a ∧ ¬b} and K3 = {(¬a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)}.
maxcons(E) contains two elements: M1 = {¬a, (¬a∧b)∨ (a∧¬b)} and M2 = {a∧¬b, (¬a∧b)∨ (a∧¬b)}. Clearly, #(M1) =
#(M2). dH ,Σ (E) ≡ a ∧ ¬b is consistent with M2 but not with M1.
Proposition 7. k operators satisfy (Card) and (Wmaj).
5.2. Computational complexity
Let  be a propositional merging operator, we consider the following decision problem merge():
• Input: a triple 〈E,μ,α〉 where E = {K1, . . . , Kn} is a proﬁle, μ ∈ L is an integrity constraint, and α ∈ L is a formula.
• Question: Does μ(E) | α hold?
For quota merging operators, we can prove that:
Proposition 8. merge(k) is coBH(3)-complete.
This coBH(3)-completeness result is obtained even in the restricted case when the query α is a propositional atom and
there is no integrity constraints (μ ≡ ). Note that this complexity class is located at a low level of the Boolean hierarchy.
Furthermore, the complexity of merge(k) decreases to coNP in the degenerate cases whenever k is not lower than the
number of bases of E or under the restriction when
∧
E ∧ μ is known at start as inconsistent.
5.3. Strategy-proofness
Let us now investigate how robust quota operators are with respect to manipulation. Intuitively, a merging operator is
strategy-proof if and only if, given the beliefs/goals of the other agents, reporting untruthful beliefs/goals does not enable
an agent to improve her satisfaction. A formal deﬁnition suited to this intuition is given in [13]:
Deﬁnition 7 (Strategy-proofness). Let i be a satisfaction index, i.e., a total function from L × L to R. A merging operator  is
strategy-proof for i if and only if there is no integrity constraint μ, no proﬁle E = {K1, . . . , Kn}, no base K and no base K ′
such that i(K ,μ(E unionsq {K ′})) > i(K ,μ(E unionsq {K })).
Clearly, there are numerous ways to deﬁne the satisfaction of an agent given a merged base. While many ad hoc deﬁni-
tions can be considered, the following three indexes from [13] are meaningful when no additional information is available:
Deﬁnition 8 (Indexes). Let K , K be two bases:
• idw (K , K) =
{
1 if K ∧ K is consistent,
0 otherwise.
• ids (K , K) =
{
1 if K | K ,
0 otherwise.
• ip(K , K) =
{
#([K ]∩[K])
#([K]) if #([K]) = 0,
0 otherwise.
For the weak drastic index (idw ), the agent is considered fully satisﬁed as soon as her beliefs/goals are consistent with
the merged base. For the strong drastic index (ids ), in order to be fully satisﬁed, the agent must impose her beliefs/goals to
the group. The probabilistic index ip is not a Boolean one, leading to a more gradual notion of satisfaction. The more similar
to the agent’s base the merged base, the more satisﬁed the agent. The similarity degree of K with K is the (normalized)
number of models of K that are models of K as well.
These three indexes are not fully independent: ensuring strategy-proofness for i p is suﬃcient to ensure strategy-
proofness for the two drastic indexes (provided that the merging operator satisﬁes (IC1)) [13].
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Strategy-proofness is hard to achieve, as illustrated in social choice theory, for the aggregation of preference relations,
by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [14,27,23]. Accordingly, it has been shown in [13] that most of existing
merging operators are not strategy-proof. So this result is an interesting one for quota operators.
5.4. Absolute and relative quotas
In the deﬁnition of quota merging operators, an absolute threshold, i.e., a ﬁxed integer not depending on the number of
bases in the proﬁle, has been used. But it can prove also sensible to express quota in a relative manner, and to deﬁne the
models of the merged base as the interpretations satisfying at least half (or two thirds, or any wanted ratio) of the initial
bases. This technique is close to a well-known voting method used in social choice theory, namely voting in committees [5].
Let us call such operators k-ratio merging operators:
Deﬁnition 9 (Ratio operators). Let k be a real number such that 0 k 1, E = {K1, . . . , Kn} be a proﬁle, and μ be an integrity
constraint. The k-ratio merging operator, denoted k , is deﬁned in a model-theoretic way as:[kμ(E)]= { {ω ∈ [μ] | ∀Ki ∈ Eω | Ki} if non-empty,{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k × n} otherwise.
Example 1 (Continued). E = {K1, K2, K3, K4} with [K1] = {100,001,010,101}, [K2] = {001,101}, [K3] = {100,000,011},
and [K4] = {111}, and the integrity constraints [μ] = W \ {010,011}. [0.25μ (E)] = {001,100,101,000,111}, [0.3μ (E)] =
[0.5μ (E)] = {001,100,101}.
One can quickly ﬁgure out the close connections between the two families of quota merging operators (the one based on
absolute quota and the other one on relative quota, or ratio). Each ratio merging operator corresponds to a family of quota
merging operators (one for each possible cardinality of the proﬁle). And for each cardinality of a proﬁle, each (absolute)
quota merging operator corresponds to a family of ratio merging operators. The exact correspondence between absolute
quotas and ratios is made precise by the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Let E be any proﬁle such that #(E) = n and let μ be an integrity constraint.
(1) Let k be a real number such that 0 k 1. We have kμ(E) ≡ k×nμ (E).
(2) Let k be an integer 0. If k < n then for any k ∈ [ kn , k+1n ), we have kμ(E) ≡ kμ(E); otherwise, we have kμ(E) ≡ 1μ(E).
Although the intuitive motivations of the two deﬁnitions of these families look different, it turns out that ratio merging
operators have exactly the same properties with respect to computational complexity and strategy-proofness as (absolute)
quota merging operators (this is a direct consequence of Proposition 10). Only some logical properties are different.
Proposition 11. k operators satisfy (IC0), (IC2), (IC3), (IC4), (IC5), (IC7), (IC8), and (Card). They satisfy (Maj) if k > 0 and (Disj) if
k 1#(E) . They do not satisfy (IC1) and (IC6) in the general case.
Proposition 11 shows that all ratio merging operators satisfy (Maj), except 0, which coincides with 0, and is trivial
(as explained before). This highly contrasts with quota operators which do not satisfy (Maj).
6. The kmax operator
Now, regardless of whether the chosen quota is absolute or not, an important point is the choice of its value. Let us
ﬁrst observe that quota merging operators lead to a sequence of merged bases that is monotonic with respect to logical
entailment:
Proposition 12. Let E be a proﬁle, μ be an integrity constraint. We have k+1μ (E) | kμ(E) for all integers k 0.
Each time k is increased, the resulting merged base is either equivalent to the one obtained for the previous value of k
or is logically stronger. In our ﬁnite propositional framework, the sequence (kμ(E))(k0) is obviously stationary from some
stage. The value for which it becomes stationary is not interesting in itself, since the corresponding merged base is either
equivalent to the conjunction of the bases of the proﬁle (with the constraints), or to the inconsistent base. But an interesting
value of k is the one leading to the last non-trivial merged base.
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⊥}). kmax is deﬁned in a model-theoretic way as:[kmaxμ (E)]= { {ω ∈ [μ] | ∀Ki ∈ Eω | Ki} if non-empty,{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) = kmax} otherwise.
While very close to quota operators, the resulting operator kmax is not a true quota operator since the value of kmax is
not given a priori, but depends on E and μ.
Example 1 (Continued). [kmaxμ (E)] = {001,100,101}.
At ﬁrst glance, kmax looks similar to the formula-based operator C4 which selects cardinality-maximal subsets in the
union of the bases from the proﬁle [15,3,4]. However, kmax and C4 are distinct: while both operators satisfy (Disj), kmax
satisﬁes (IC3) and (Maj) (see Proposition 1) and C4 satisﬁes none of them [15]. Indeed, kmax belongs to two important
families of model-based merging operators, namely the Σ family and the Gmax family when the drastic distance4 dD is
used [19]:
Proposition 13. kmax = dD ,Σ = dD ,Gmax.
Accordingly, kmax exhibits many expected logical properties:
Lemma 1. kmax satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8), (Maj), (Disj) and (Card).
Since kmax is obtained by considering the problem of optimizing the quota (for quota operators, k is given, so it does
not need to be computed), the corresponding inference problem is computationally harder than the inference problem for
quota operators (under the standard assumptions of complexity theory):
Lemma 2. merge(kmax) is Θ p2 -complete.
Clearly enough, if kmax is computed during an off-line pre-processing stage and becomes part of the input afterwards,
the complexity falls down to coNP.
Now, as to strategy-proofness, the kmax operator exhibits all the good properties of quota operators:
Lemma 3. kmax is strategy-proof for the three indexes ip , idw and ids .
The result directly follows from the fact that kmaxμ coincides with dD ,Σμ (Proposition 13), that is known to be strategy-
proof [13].
7. GMIN operators
Starting from kmax , one could wonder whether it is possible to constrain further the quota operators so as to get
operators with a higher inferential power, i.e., allowing more conclusions to be obtained. In this section we provide a family
Gmin of such operators. As far as we know, this family has never been considered up to now in a propositional merging
context.
Each operator d,Gmin of the Gmin family is parameterized by a pseudo-distance d:
Deﬁnition 11 (Pseudo-distances). A pseudo-distance between interpretations is a function d from W × W to N such that for
every ω1, ω2 ∈ W :
• d(ω1,ω2) = d(ω2,ω1), and
• d(ω1,ω2) = 0 if and only if ω1 = ω2.
Any pseudo-distance between interpretations d induces a “distance” between an interpretation ω and a formula K given by
d(ω, K ) =minω′|K d(ω,ω′).
4 For any ω1,ω2 ∈W,dD (ω1,ω2) = 0 if ω1 = ω2 and dD (ω1,ω2) = 1 otherwise.
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dH ,Gmin operator.
ω K1 K2 K3 K4 ddH ,Gmin(ω, E)
000 1 1 0 3 (0,1,1,3)
001 0 0 1 2 (0,0,1,2)
100 0 1 0 2 (0,0,1,2)
101 0 0 1 1 (0,0,1,1)
110 1 2 1 1 (1,1,1,2)
111 1 1 1 0 (0,1,1,1)
Examples of such pseudo-distances are the drastic distance dD (cf. footnote 4), and the Dalal distance [11], noted dH , that
is the Hamming distance between interpretations (d(ω1,ω2) is equal to the number of atoms on which ω1 and ω2 differ).
Then d,Gmin operators are deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 12 (Gmin operators). Let d be a pseudo-distance, μ an integrity constraint, E = {K1, . . . , Kn} a proﬁle and let ω be
an interpretation. The “distance” dd,Gmin(ω, E) is deﬁned as the list of numbers (d1, . . . ,dn) obtained by sorting in increasing
order the multi-set {d(ω, Ki) | Ki ∈ E}. The models of d,Gminμ (E) are the models ω of μ such that dd,Gmin(ω, E) is minimal
with respect to the lexicographic ordering lex induced by the natural order,5 i.e.,
ωd,GminE ω
′ iff dd,Gmin(ω, E)lex dd,Gmin
(
ω′, E
)
and [d,Gminμ (E)]=min([μ],d,GminE ).
Example 1 (Continued). [dD ,Gminμ (E)] = {001,100,101}. [dH ,Gminμ (E)] = {101}. The computations are reported in Table 1.
Each row corresponds to a model ω of the constraint μ. Each column Ki gives the distance dH (ω, Ki) between a model ω
of μ and the base Ki . The boldface row corresponds to the model of μ which minimizes ddH ,Gmin(., E).
As stated by the following proposition, each Gmin operator reﬁnes kmax . As a consequence, each of them reﬁnes also
every quota merging operator which does not lead to an inconsistent merged base, thanks to Proposition 12.
Proposition 14. For any pseudo-distance d, any integrity constraint μ and any proﬁle E, d,Gminμ (E) | kmaxμ (E).
The choice of the drastic distance leads exactly to kmax :
Proposition 15. dD ,Gmin = kmax .
Furthermore, Gmin operators are IC merging operators:
Proposition 16. Let d be any pseudo-distance. d,Gmin satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8), and (Disj). It does not satisfy (Card), (Maj) and (Wmaj)
in the general case.
The signiﬁcance of Proposition 14 is improved by the fact that d,Gmin satisﬁes (IC1); Indeed, together with Proposi-
tion 16, it shows that d,Gmin preserves at least all the information from the bases as those preserved by kmax , without
leading to an inconsistent merged base.
As shown by the previous proposition, each operator d,Gmin satisﬁes (Disj). This is also the case of formula-based
merging operators. However, Gmin operators appear as much better operators than formula-based ones with respect to
logical properties. Indeed, while formula-based merging operators typically fail to satisfy important logical properties [15],
d,Gmin operators are IC merging operators (i.e., they satisfy (IC0)–(IC8)).
It is also interesting to observe that each d,Gmin satisﬁes a second weakening of (Maj):
(Wmaj2) If (
∨
E2) ∧ μ is consistent, then ∃n μ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | μ(E2).
(Wmaj2) adds just a precondition to the usual (Maj) property. It asks to listen to the majority when at least one base of
this majority is consistent with the integrity constraints.
5 We give here the deﬁnition of Gmin by means of lists of numbers. Using Ordered Weighted Averages, one could deﬁne it directly from distances
(numbers) so as to ﬁt the deﬁnition of model-based operators (see [16]).
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example, quota operators satisfy (Wmaj) but they do not satisfy (Wmaj2), and Gmin operators satisfy (Wmaj2) but they do
not satisfy (Wmaj).
Proposition 17. Let d be any pseudo-distance. d,Gmin satisﬁes (Wmaj2).
To conclude with the logical properties, while at the deﬁnition level, Gmin operators are close to the well-known Gmax
arbitration operators [19]: the difference between them just lies in the choice of distinct aggregation functions from the
lexicographic family, Gmin vs. Gmax. However, the behaviours of d,Gmin and d,Gmax from a logical point of view are
quite different in general. Thus, though both operators are IC merging ones, dH ,Gmin satisﬁes (Disj) but does not satisfy
the arbitration postulate (Arb) (see [19] for details about (Arb)), while dH ,Gmax satisﬁes (Arb) but does not satisfy (Disj).
Accordingly, each operator is suited to one of the merging scenarios sketched in Section 1, but not to both of them.
Let us now investigate the strategy-proofness issue for Gmin operators. In the general case, strategy-proofness of quota
merging operators is lost. As shown in [13], even if an operator is not strategy-proof in the general case, it may happen that
strategy-proofness is achievable under some restrictions. It turns out that strategy-proofness can be guaranteed for Gmin
operators, but only in some very speciﬁc cases:
Proposition 18. Let d be any pseudo-distance.
• d,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip if every base from the proﬁle E is complete (i.e., each base has a unique model).
• d,Gmin is strategy-proof for the indexes idw and ids if every base from the proﬁle E is complete, or if #(E) = 2 and μ ≡ .
Considering some speciﬁc distances, additional strategy-proofness results can be obtained:
Proposition 19.
• dD ,Gmin is strategy-proof for the three indexes idw , ip and ids .
• dH ,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip if and only if every base from the proﬁle E is complete.
• dH ,Gmin is strategy-proof for idw and ids if and only if every base from the proﬁle E is complete or if #(E) = 2 and μ ≡ .
Although Gmin operators can be seen as improvements of quota operators in the sense that they allow to draw more
conclusions, this gain in inferential power has to be paid by the lost of most of the strategy-proofness properties, which are
a main advantage of quota operators.
As to the strategy-proofness criterion, the behaviour of Gmin operators is quite good compared to other model-based
operators [13].
Finally, let us turn to the computational complexity criterion. The next proposition is a direct consequence of a result
from [16]:
Proposition 20. Assume that the pseudo-distance d(ω1,ω2) of any pair of interpretations ω1 and ω2 can be computed in time
polynomial in |ω1| + |ω2|. Then merge(d,Gmin) is in p2 .
For speciﬁc choices of d, more precise results can be derived:
Proposition 21.
• merge(dD ,Gmin) is Θ p2 -complete.
• merge(dH ,Gmin) is p2 -complete.
As one may expect, the complexity of inference for Gmin operators is slightly higher than the complexity of inference for
quota operators (under the usual assumptions of complexity theory). However, it remains at the ﬁrst level of the polynomial
hierarchy under reasonable requirements on the pseudo-distance, and is comparable to the complexity of model-based
operators. This shows that Gmin operators are typically better merging operators than formula-based ones with respect
to the computational dimension (for many formula-based operators inference is at the second level of the polynomial
hierarchy).
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the standard unanimity condition for preference aggregation in the setting of propo-
sitional merging. We have shown that this unanimity condition can be interpreted in two different ways in the merging
framework.
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merging operators satisfy it.
The second one is about the countermodels of the bases. While it is very natural, it is not captured by existing postulates.
This led us to introduce a new (Disj)unction postulate.
Unfortunately, only few operators satisfy (Disj), and they are typically formula-based operators. As such, they perform
badly with respect to the standard criteria used to evaluate merging operators, namely, logical properties, computational
complexity and strategy-proofness. Actually, the very argument to make use of formula-based operators for a merging issue
is that they are disjunctive in essence. This is not very satisfying and this calls for disjunctive operators achieving better
trade-offs with respect to the three criteria.
In order to ﬁll this gap, we have introduced two new families of disjunctive model-based merging operators, namely
quota operators and Gmin operators. Investigating their properties, we have shown that these operators are interesting al-
ternatives to formula-based merging operators. Thus, both quota and Gmin operators have a complexity lying at the ﬁrst
level of the polynomial hierarchy, while the family of formula-based merging operators does not offer this property. Quota
operators are strategy-proof unlike the great majority of other existing merging operators. Furthermore, even if Gmin oper-
ators are not strategy-proof in the general case, these operators perform quite well with respect to this criterion compared
to other model-based operators. Finally, Gmin operators are IC merging operators while formula-based merging operators
typically fail to satisfy IC constraints. Accordingly, our results show that formula-based merging operators can be proﬁtably
replaced by Gmin operators.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (UnaF) is equivalent to (Disj).
• Let us prove that (UnaF) implies (Disj). Suppose that ∨ E is consistent with μ, then take the formula α =∨ E . Then
clearly ∀K ∈ E , K | α. Since ∨ E is consistent with μ there is at least one K s.t. K is consistent with μ. So by (UnaF)
we get μ(E) | α, that is exactly the conclusion of (Disj).
• Let us show that (Disj) implies (UnaF). Suppose that ∃K ∈ E s.t. μ∧ K is consistent and that ∀K ∈ E , K | α. As ∃K ∈ E
s.t. μ∧ K is consistent, we have ∨ E consistent with μ. So by (Disj) μ(E) |∨ E . Since the hypothesis ∀K ∈ E , K | α
implies that
∨
E | α, by transitivity we obtain μ(E) | α. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (Disj) is equivalent to (UnaC).
• Let us prove that (Disj) implies (UnaC). Suppose that ∨ E is consistent with μ. Let ω be an interpretation such that
∀K ∈ E,ω | K . Then ω |∨ E . Since μ(E) |∨ E , if ω |∨ E , then ω | μ(E): this proves (UnaC).
• Let us prove that (UnaC) implies (Disj). Suppose that ∨ E is consistent with μ. Let ω be an interpretation such that
ω | μ(E). If ∀K ∈ E,ω | K , then ω cannot be a model of μ(E), so ∃K ∈ E , ω | K , and consequently ω |∨ E: this
proves (Disj). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The fact that conditions (1)–(6) of syncretic assignments corresponds to IC postulates (IC0)–(IC8)
is a consequence of the representation theorem given in [19]. So it remains to show that condition (d) corresponds to
postulate (Disj).
(If) Consider a merging operator  deﬁned from a disjunctive syncretic assignment. Let us show that  satisﬁes (Disj).
Suppose that
∨
E is consistent with μ. This means that ∃ω ∈ W such that ω | ∨ E and ω | μ. Towards a contra-
diction, suppose that μ(E) | ∨ E , that is ∃ω′ ∈ W such that ω′ | μ(E) and ω′ | ∨ E . ω′ | μ(E) implies that
ω′ ∈ min([μ],E), that is ω′′ | μ such that ω′′ <E ω′ . Since ω′ | ∨ E and ω | ∨ E we obtain by (d) that ω <E ω′ .
Contradiction.
(Only If) Let  be a disjunctive IC merging operator (i.e.,  satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8) and (Disj)). Then we deﬁne a syn-
cretic assignment in the usual way [19], as follows: ∀ω,ω′ ∈ W , ω E ω′ if and only if ω | ϕ{ω,ω′ }(E). Let us show that
condition (d) holds. Suppose that ω |∨ E and ω′ |∨ E . This implies that ∨ E is consistent with ϕ{ω,ω′} . By (Disj) we
get that ϕ{ω,ω′ } (E) |
∨
E . By (IC0) we also have that ϕ{ω,ω′ } (E) | ϕ{ω,ω′} . Hence we have ϕ{ω,ω′ }(E) |
∨
E ∧ ϕ{ω,ω′} .
By assumption
∨
E ∧ ϕ{ω,ω′} ≡ ϕ{ω} . Therefore ϕ{ω,ω′ }(E) | ϕ{ω} . By (IC1) we get that ϕ{ω,ω′ }(E) is consistent, hence
ϕ{ω,ω′ }(E) ≡ ϕ{ω} . By deﬁnition of the assignment we ﬁnally get that ω <E ω′ . 
Proof of Proposition 4.
(IC0) If  satisﬁes (IC0), then by construction, d satisﬁes (IC0).
(IC1) If (
∨
E) ∧ μ is not consistent, then dμ(E) is not consistent, so d does not satisfy (IC1), even if  satisﬁes (IC1).
(IC2) If (
∧
E) ∧ μ is consistent, then (∧ E) ∧ (∨ E) ∧ μ is consistent as well. Hence, if  satisﬁes (IC2), we get that
dIC (E) ≡ (
∧
E) ∧ (∨ E) ∧ μ ≡ (∧ E) ∧ μ.
(IC3) Obviously satisﬁed.
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dμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 is consistent if and only if dμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 is consistent. So suppose that dμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 is
consistent. Then d(K1∨K2)∧μ({K1, K2})∧ K1 is consistent. In order to simplify the notations, let us note μ′ the formula
(K1 ∨ K2)∧μ. Because K1 | μ and K2 | μ, we have K1 | μ′ and K2 | μ′ and dμ′ ({K1, K2})∧ K1 consistent. Since
 satisﬁes (IC4), dμ′ ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 is also consistent and d satisﬁes (IC4).
(IC5) and (IC6): As a counter-example, we consider four bases: [K1] = {000}, [K2] = {111}, [K3] = {000,011,110, 101},
[K4] = {001,010,100} and two proﬁles E1 = {K1, K2} and E2 = {K3, K4}. Then [dH ,Σ∨ E1 (E1)] = {000,111} and
[dH ,Σ∨ E2 (E2)] = {000,001,010, 011,100,101,110}. So, as dH ,Σ∨ E1 (E1) and dH ,Σ∨ E2 (E2) are consistent, [dH ,Σ∨ E1 (E1) ∧
dH ,Σ∨ E2 (E2)] = {000}. With E = E1 unionsq E2, we have [dH ,Σ∨ E1∨∨ E2 (E)] = {001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110}. Consequently,
dH ,Σ∨ E1 (E1) ∧ dH ,Σ∨ E2 (E2) | dH ,Σ∨ E1∨∨ E2 (E1 unionsq E2), which contradicts (IC5) and dH ,Σ∨ E1∨∨ E2 (E1 unionsq E2) | dH ,Σ∨ E1 (E1) ∧
dH ,Σ∨ E2 (E2), which contradicts (IC6).
(IC7) We consider a proﬁle E , two integrity constraints μ1 and μ2. We suppose that  satisﬁes (IC7). We have to show
that dμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | dμ1∧μ2 (E), i.e., (∨ E)∧μ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | (∨ E)∧μ1∧μ2 (E). Let us note μ′1 the formula (∨ E) ∧
μ1. We have (∨ E)∧μ1 (E) ∧ μ2 ≡ μ′1 (E) ∧ μ2. As  satisﬁes (IC7), μ′1 (E) ∧ μ2 | μ′1∧μ2 (E). As μ′1∧μ2 (E) ≡(∨ E)∧μ1∧μ2 (E), the result holds.
(IC8) Suppose dμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 consistent. We must show that dμ1∧μ2 (E) | dμ1 (E) ∧ μ2, that means (∨ E)∧μ1∧μ2 (E) |(∨ E)∧μ1 (E)∧μ2. With μ′1 ≡ (∨ E)∧μ1, we have (∨ E)∧μ1∧μ2 (E) ≡ μ′1∧μ2 (E) consistent. As  satisﬁes (IC8) andμ′1∧μ2 (E) is consistent, we get μ′1∧μ2 (E) | μ′1 (E) ∧ μ2. Since μ′1 (E) ∧ μ2 ≡ (∨ E)∧μ1∧μ2 (E), the result holds:
d satisﬁes (IC8) if  does.
(Disj) If  satisﬁes (IC0), then by construction, d satisﬁes (Disj). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Immediate from the two following equalities:
• [∧ E ∧ μ] = {ω ∈ [μ] | ∀Ki ∈ E ω | Ki}.
• [∨C∈nk(∧ j∈C K j) ∧ μ] = {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
(IC0) Obvious from the deﬁnition of k .
(IC1) Consider the following counter-example: E = {K1, K2}; K1 = {a}, K2 = {¬a}, k = 2 and μ = . μ is consistent but
kμ(E) is not.
(IC2) Obvious from the deﬁnition of k .
(IC3) Obvious from the deﬁnition of k .
(IC4) We have to show that if K1 | μ, K2 | μ, and kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 | ⊥, then kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 | ⊥.
Let E = {K1, K2}. Assume that K1 | μ and K2 | μ. There are two cases:
• K1 ∧ K2 ∧μ is consistent. Then kμ({K1, K2}) ≡ K1 ∧ K2 ∧μ. Since kμ({K1, K2})∧ K2 is consistent, (IC4) is satisﬁed.• K1 ∧ K2 ∧ μ is inconsistent.
Then [kμ({K1, K2})] = {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}. Four cases for k have to be considered:
k 3. No interpretation can satisfy k bases of E since #(E) = 2, hence kμ({K1, K2}) ≡ ⊥ and (IC4) trivially holds.
k = 2. Again, no interpretation can satisfy k bases of E since #(E) = 2 and (by assumption) K1 ∧ K2 ∧ μ | ⊥. (IC4)
trivially holds as well.
k = 1. The models of the merged base are the models of μ satisfying one base of E . Hence, the result of the merging
process is equivalent to (K1 ∨ K2) ∧ μ. Therefore, kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 is equivalent to K2, which is consistent
(remind that every base from a proﬁle is consistent). Again, (IC4) holds.
k = 0. We have kμ({K1, K2}) ≡ μ. Since K2 ∧ μ is equivalent to K2 that is consistent, (IC4) is satisﬁed.
(IC5) In order to show that (IC5) holds, we have to prove that μ(E1)∧μ(E2) | μ(E1unionsq E2). We ﬁrst prove the following
lemma:
Lemma 4. Let E, E ′ and F be three proﬁles, with E ′ = E unionsq F . Then:
• if∧ E ′ ∧ μ is consistent, then kμ(E ′) | kμ(E).
• if∧ E ∧ μ is not consistent, then kμ(E) | kμ(E ′).
Proof.
• If ∧ E ′ ∧μ is consistent, then ∧ E ∧μ is consistent since E ′ = E unionsq F . Hence kμ(E) ≡∧ E ∧μ, and kμ(E ′) ≡∧ E ′ ∧μ.
Since
∧
E ′ ∧ μ ≡∧ E ∧∧ F ∧ μ, we get kμ(E ′) | kμ(E).
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k > #(E). We have kμ(E) ≡ ⊥, since no model of μ can satisfy k bases of E . As a consequence, we get kμ(E) | kμ(E ′).
k #(E). We have [kμ(E)] = {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})  k} and [kμ(E ′)] = {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E ′ | ω | Ki})  k}.
Since every model of μ satisfying at least k bases from E also satisﬁes at least k bases from its superset
E ′ = E unionsq F , we obtain that kμ(E) | kμ(E ′). 
With E = E1 and E ′ = E1 unionsq E2, Lemma 4 shows that if ∧ E1 ∧ μ is inconsistent, then kμ(E1) | kμ(E1 unionsq E2). Similarly,
we also get that kμ(E2) | kμ(E1unionsq E2) (E1 and E2 play symmetric roles here). As a consequence, if
∧
E1∧μ is inconsistent
or
∧
E2 ∧ μ is inconsistent, we have that kμ(E1) ∧ kμ(E2) | kμ(E1 unionsq E2), since classical entailment is monotonic. Hence
(IC5) is satisﬁed.
The case when
∧
E1 ∧ μ is consistent and ∧ E2 ∧ μ is consistent remains to be considered. In this case, we have
kμ(E1) ≡
∧
E1 ∧ μ and kμ(E2) ≡
∧
E2 ∧ μ by deﬁnition of the quota merging operator. Hence, kμ(E1) ∧ kμ(E2) ≡∧
E1 ∧∧ E2 ∧μ. Now, every quota operator is such that, for any proﬁle E and any integrity constraint μ, ∧ E ∧μ | kμ(E)
(this is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of k). Taking ∧ E equivalent to ∧ E1 ∧∧ E2 gives that (IC5) also holds in
this case.
(IC6) Consider the following counter-example: P = {a}, E1 = {{a}, {a}, {¬a}}, E2 = {{a}, {a}, {¬a}} and μ = . We have
2μ(E1) ≡ a and 2μ(E2) ≡ a, hence the conjunction 2μ(E1) ∧ 2μ(E2) is consistent. We also have 2μ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡ ,
which does not entail 2μ(E1).
(IC7) We have to show that kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | kμ1∧μ2 (E). We consider two cases:
(1) If
∧
E ∧ μ1 is consistent, then kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 ≡
∧
E ∧ μ1 ∧ μ2. Since we have ∧ E ∧ μ1 ∧ μ2 | kμ1∧μ2 (E), (IC7)
trivially holds.
(2) If
∧
E ∧ μ1 is inconsistent, then we have[kμ1(E) ∧ μ2]= {ω ∈ [μ1] ∣∣ #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}∩ [μ2].
Furthermore, when
∧
E ∧ μ1 is inconsistent, we also have that ∧ E ∧ μ1 ∧ μ2 is inconsistent and[kμ1∧μ2(E)]= {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] ∣∣ #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}.
Therefore kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 ≡ kμ1∧μ2 (E), and (IC7) is satisﬁed.
(IC8) We have to show that if kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 is consistent, then kμ1∧μ2 (E) | kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2. We consider three cases:
(1) If μ1 ∧ μ2 ∧∧ E is consistent, then μ1 ∧∧ E is consistent as well and we have kμ1∧μ2 (E) ≡ μ1 ∧ μ2 ∧∧ E .
Hence kμ1∧μ2 (E) | kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2, and (IC8) is satisﬁed.
(2) If μ1 ∧ E is inconsistent, then μ1 ∧ μ2 ∧∧ E is inconsistent. In this case:[kμ1(E)]= {ω ∈ [μ1] ∣∣ #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}.
Since [kμ1∧μ2 (E)] = {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}, we have:
kμ1∧μ2(E) | kμ1(E) ∧ μ2,
and (IC8) holds.
(3) The remaining case is when μ1 ∧μ2 ∧∧ E is inconsistent and μ1 ∧∧ E is consistent. In this case, kμ1 (E)∧μ2 ≡
μ1 ∧∧ E ∧ μ2 is inconsistent, hence (IC8) trivially holds.
(Disj) There are two cases:
(1) If (
∧
E) ∧ μ is consistent, then kμ(E) ≡ (
∧
E) ∧ μ and kμ(E) | (
∨
E) ∧ μ.
(2) If (
∧
E)∧μ is not consistent, then the models of kμ(E) are the models of μ which satisfy at least k bases (k 1)
of the proﬁle E . So they also are models of (
∨
E) ∧ μ, and the result holds.
(Maj) Consider the following counter-example: P = {a}, E1 = {K1}, E2 = {K2}, K1 = {a}, K2 = {¬a}, k = 1, μ = . The
interpretation ω = (a = 1) is a model of 1μ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) for every n  0 since it satisﬁes K1. Contrastingly, ω
is not a model of 1μ(E2) ≡ ¬a. 
Proof of Proposition 7.
(Card) Let M1,M2 ∈maxconsμ(E) such that #(M1) #(M2). By hypothesis kμ(E)∧M1 is consistent. There are two cases:
(1) (
∧
E) ∧ μ is consistent. Then kμ(E) ≡ (
∧
E) ∧ μ. As a consequence, maxconsμ(E) = {E}. So kμ(E) ∧ M2 is
consistent.
(2) (
∧
E) ∧ μ is not consistent. Let ω be any model of kμ(E) ∧ M1; ω is a model of M1 which satisﬁes at least k
bases of the proﬁle E (since kμ(E) is consistent when kμ(E)∧M1 is consistent). Since M1 ∈maxconsμ(E), we can
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of E . Subsequently, ω′ is a model of kμ(E) as well, and kμ(E) ∧ M2 is consistent.
(Wmaj) Suppose that kμ(E2) is consistent. There are two cases:
(1) (
∧
E2) ∧ μ is consistent. Then kμ(E2) ≡ (
∧
E2) ∧ μ.
• If ∧(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ μ is consistent, then kμ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡ ∧(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ μ, which is trivially consistent with
(
∧
E2) ∧ μ, hence with kμ(E2). Thus (Wmaj) holds with n = 1.• If ∧(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ μ is not consistent, then for any integer n  0, ∧(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) is not consistent. The
models of kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) are by deﬁnition the models of μ that satisﬁes at least k bases of E1 unionsq
E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. Let ω be a model of kμ(E2). Since #(E2)  1, ω satisﬁes μ and at least one base of E2.
Hence, for any n  k, ω satisﬁes μ and at least k bases of E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. Subsequently, ω is a model of
kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) and of kμ(E2).
(2) (
∧
E2) ∧ μ is not consistent. Let us consider any model ω of kμ(E2);
ω satisﬁes μ and at least k bases of E2. Hence ω satisﬁes μ and at least k bases of E1 unionsq E2, so ω is a model of
kμ(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ kμ(E2). Thus (Wmaj) holds with n = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 8.
• Membership: we give a polynomial reduction from merge(k) to unsat(3), the language deﬁned by unsat(3) =
{〈φ1, φ2, φ3〉 | φ1, φ2, φ3 ∈ L and φ1 ∈ unsat or (φ2 ∈ sat and φ3 ∈ unsat)}. We have shown in Proposition 5 that when∧
E ∧ μ is inconsistent, we have kμ(E) ≡ (
∨
C∈nk
∧
j∈C K j) ∧ μ where nk= {C ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} | #(C) = k}. Moreover,
(
∨
C∈nk
∧
j∈C K j) ∧ μ has a size polynomial in |E| + |μ|. Let f be the polynomial reduction which assigns to every
instance 〈E,μ,α〉 of merge(k) the instance 〈φ1 = (∨C∈nk∧ j∈C K j) ∧μ∧¬α, φ2 =∧ E ∧μ,φ3 =∧ E ∧μ∧¬α〉 of
unsat(3). As
∧
E ∧ μ | kμ(E), we have 〈E,μ,α〉 ∈ merge(k) if and only if (
∨
C∈nk
∧
j∈C K j) ∧ μ ∧ ¬α ∈ unsat or
(
∧
E ∧ μ ∈ sat and ∧ E ∧ μ ∧ ¬α ∈ unsat).
• Hardness: we do not give a direct polynomial reduction of unsat(3) to merge(k), but give a faithful and modular
polynomial traduction of the full-meet inference problem (which is equivalent to the inference problem from a merged
base using the full meet merging operator or, equivalently, the quota operator with quota 0) to the inference from a
merged base using any quota operator. The full-meet inference problem can be deﬁned by: for all φ1, φ2, φ3 ∈ L, we
have φ1 ◦FM φ2 | φ3 if and only if:
if φ1 ∧ φ2 is consistent
then φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ3
else φ2 | φ3.
Inference from a merged base using any quota operator can be deﬁned as follows; for any proﬁle E , integrity constraint
μ and formula α, we have kμ(E) | α if and only if:
if
∧
E ∧ μ is consistent
then
∧
E ∧ μ | α
else (
∨
C∈nk
∧
j∈C K j) ∧ μ | α.
To any integer k  0 and triple of formulas 〈φ1, φ2, φ3〉 of L, we can associate in polynomial time the triple 〈E =
{φ1} unionsq {φ2}k,μ = φ2,α = φ3〉 where {φ2}k is the multi-set in which φ2 appears k times (in particular, the empty multi-set
when k = 0). We have φ1 ◦FM φ2 | φ3 if and only if kμ(E) | α. Since the full-meet inference problem is coBH(3)-hard (cf.
Proposition 4.3 from [24]), this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 9. We ﬁrst consider the probabilistic index ip .
Reductio ad absurdum. Assume that there exists an integer k  0 and an integrity constraint μ such that kμ is not
strategy-proof for ip . Hence there exists a proﬁle E = {K2, . . . , Kn}, two bases K and K ′ such that
ip
(
K ,kμ
(
E unionsq {K }))< ip(K ,kμ(E unionsq {K ′})). (A.1)
There are two cases:
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satisﬁes strictly less than k− 1 bases of E . In those two cases, ω cannot satisfy kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) since it satisﬁes at most k− 1
bases from E unionsq {K ′} or it does not satisfy μ.
Therefore, ∀ω | K ,ω | kμ(Eunionsq{K ′}). Hence #([K ]∩[kμ(Eunionsq{K ′})]) = 0. As a consequence, ip(K ,(Eunionsq{K ′})) = 0, which
prevents from any manipulation for ip .
(2) kμ(E unionsq {K }) is consistent. Hence we have from Inequation (A.1):
#([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })])
#([kμ(E unionsq {K })])
<
#([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K ′})])
#([kμ(E unionsq {K ′})])
. (A.2)
Two cases have to be considered:
• ∧ E ∧ K ∧μ is consistent. Then kμ(E unionsq {K }) ≡∧ E ∧ K ∧μ. Hence each model of kμ(E unionsq {K }) is a model of K , which
implies that the value ip(K ,kμ(E unionsq {K })) = 1 is maximum, so it cannot be improved, and no manipulation is possible
in this case.
• ∧ E ∧ K ∧ μ is inconsistent. Then kμ(E unionsq {K }) ≡ (∨C∈nk(∧ j∈C K j)) ∧ μ, where K1 = K and E = {K2, . . . , Kn}. As
kμ(E unionsq {K }) is consistent, there are two cases:
–
∧
E ∧ K ′ ∧μ is consistent. Then kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) ≡
∧
E ∧ K ′ ∧μ. No model of K is a model of kμ(E unionsq {K ′}). Indeed, if it
were not the case, there would exist an interpretation ω such that ω | K and ω |∧(E unionsq {K ′}) ∧ μ. Then we would
have ω |∧(E unionsq {K })∧μ which is impossible since ∧ E ∧ K ∧μ is inconsistent. Hence [K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K ′})] = ∅ and
ip(K ,kμ(E unionsq {K ′})) = 0, which prevents from any manipulation for ip .
–
∧
E ∧ K ′ ∧ μ is inconsistent. Then kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) ≡ (
∨
C∈nk(
∧
j∈C K ′j)) ∧ μ, where K ′1 = K ′ and K ′i = Ki for i > 1.
If ω | K and ω | kμ(E unionsq {K }), then ω does not satisfy μ or ω satisﬁes strictly less than k − 1 bases Ki with i > 1.
In the two cases, ω cannot be a model of kμ(E unionsq {K ′}). As a consequence:
#
([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]) #([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K ′})]). (A.3)
On the other hand, if ω | K and ω | kμ(E unionsq {K }), then there exist at least k bases Ki with i > 1 such that ω |
Ki ∧ μ. Then ω | kμ(E unionsq {K ′}), and subsequently:
#
([¬K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]) #([¬K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K ′})]). (A.4)
In order to simplify the notations, we set:
x = #([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]), y = #([¬K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]),
x′ = #([K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]), y′ = #([¬K ] ∩ [kμ(E unionsq {K })]).
Inequation (A.2) becomes: xx+y <
x′
x′+y′ . Since y  y′ from (A.4), we have:
x
x+y <
x′
x′+y . From (A.3), we know that
x x′ . Hence we can write x′ = x− z, with z 0. We get xx+y < x−zx+y−z , which is equivalent to:
(x)(x+ y − z)
(x+ y)(x+ y − z) <
(x− z)(x+ y)
(x+ y − z)(x+ y) ,
hence zy < 0 with y, and z positive: this is impossible.
A manipulation for idw entails a manipulation for ip , even if the operator does not satisfy (IC1) (see [13]). So the
strategy-proofness of quota merging operators for idw comes from the above proof for ip .
Finally, the last case concerns the strong drastic index ids . Let us suppose that there is a manipulation for this index:
assume that there exists an integer k  0 and an integrity constraint μ such that kμ is not strategy-proof for ids . Hence
there exist a proﬁle E = {K2, . . . , Kn}, two bases K and K ′ such that
ids
(
K ,kμ
(
E unionsq {K }))< ids(K ,kμ(E unionsq {K ′})).
This inequation implies that:
ids
(
K ,kμ
(
E unionsq {K }))= 0 so kμ (E unionsq {K }) | K
and
ids
(
K ,kμ
(
E unionsq {K ′}))= 1 so kμ (E unionsq {K ′}) | K .
If kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) is consistent, this implies a manipulation for the index ip (see [13]), and we have seen that it is impossible
in the ﬁrst part of the proof. Now, if kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) is not consistent, then there are two cases:
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contradicts the assumption.
• k #(E unionsq {K ′}). In this case, there is no model of μ which satisﬁes k bases among {K2, . . . , Kn, K ′}. Since kμ(E unionsq {K })
is consistent, the models of kμ(E unionsq {K }) are models of K , which contradicts the assumption.
Hence, no manipulation is possible when kμ(E unionsq {K ′}) is not consistent, and quota merging operators are strategy-proof
for ids . 
Proof of Proposition 10. There are two cases:
(1) If
∧
E ∧ μ is consistent, kμ(E) ≡
∧
E ∧ μ ≡ kμ(E) for every integer k 0 and every real number k ∈ [0,1].
(2) If
∧
E ∧ μ is not consistent, then we consider two cases:
• kμ(E) is consistent. Let ω be a model of kμ(E). Then ω satisﬁes μ and at least k bases of E . So ω satisﬁes μ and
a ratio of bases of E greater or equal to k = kn . Hence ω | kμ(E), and as a consequence, kμ(E) | kμ(E). Conversely,
if kμ(E) is consistent and ω is a model of kμ(E), then ω satisﬁes μ and a ratio of bases of E greater or equal to k.
So ω satisﬁes μ and at least k = k × n bases of E . Hence ω | kμ(E), and as a consequence, kμ(E) | kμ(E). This
completes the proof.
• kμ(E) is not consistent. Then no model of μ satisﬁes at least k bases of E . If k  n, no model of μ satisﬁes a ratio of
bases of E equal to 1 (since
∧
E ∧ μ is not consistent). Hence 1μ(E) is inconsistent, and as a consequence, we have
1μ(E) ≡ kμ(E). If k < n, no model of μ satisﬁes a ratio of bases of E greater or equal to k = kn (otherwise it would
satisfy at least k bases of E). Hence kμ(E) is inconsistent, and as a consequence, kμ(E) ≡ kμ(E). 
Proof of Proposition 11. Thanks to Proposition 10, many proofs for the ratio operators can be deduced from the proofs
for the corresponding absolute quota operators. More precisely, each time the cardinality of the proﬁle E can be ﬁxed at
the beginning of the proof, i.e., for (IC0), (IC1), (IC2), (IC3), (IC4), (IC7), (IC8), (Disj) for a ratio  1#(E) and (Card), the
corresponding proof for the ratio operators can be obtained from the proof for the absolute quota operators by making the
following changes; let n be the cardinality of the initial proﬁle E , and let k and k be two numbers linked as explained in
Proposition 10; replace
• 〈kμ〉 by 〈kμ〉,
• 〈k bases〉 by 〈a ratio k = kn of bases〉,
• 〈{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}〉 by 〈{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki∈E|ω|Ki})n  k}〉.
Thus only three proofs are missing:
• (IC5): We consider two proﬁles E1 with #(E1) = n1 and E2 with #(E2) = n2. If k is the given ratio, we note k1 = k×n1,
k2 = k × n2 and k = k × (n1 + n2) = k1 + k2.
If kμ(E1) ∧ kμ(E2) is not consistent, then the implication is obvious. Otherwise, let us consider any model ω of
kμ(E1) ∧ kμ(E2). There are three cases:
– (
∧
E1) ∧ μ and (∧ E2) ∧ μ are consistent. Then kμ(E1) ≡ (∧ E1) ∧ μ and kμ(E2) ≡ (∧ E2) ∧ μ. In that case,
ω | (∧ E1) ∧ (∧ E2) ∧ μ, so ∧(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ μ is consistent. Hence kμ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡ (∧ E1) ∧ (∧ E2) ∧ μ, and we have
kμ(E1) ∧ kμ(E2) | kμ(E1 unionsq E2).
– One but not both of (
∧
E1) ∧ μ and (∧ E2) ∧ μ is consistent. Assume that (∧ E1) ∧ μ is consistent and (∧ E2) ∧ μ
is not (the remaining case is similar by symmetry). Let us consider ω that satisﬁes μ, n1 bases of E1, and at least k2
bases of E2. So it satisﬁes at least n1 + k2 bases of E1 unionsq E2. Subsequently, ω satisﬁes μ and a ratio greater or equal
to n1+k2n1+n2 of bases of E1 unionsq E2. Since n1  k1, we have:
n1 + k2
n1 + n2 
k1 + k2
n1 + n2 
k
n1 + n2  k.
Hence ω satisﬁes μ and a ratio greater or equal to k bases of E1 unionsq E2. So ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2).
– (
∧
E1)∧μ is not consistent and (∧ E2)∧μ is not consistent. Then, ω satisﬁes μ, at least k1 bases of E1, and at least
k2 bases of E2. Hence it satisﬁes at least k1 + k2 = k bases of E1 unionsq E2. So ω satisﬁes μ and a ratio greater or equal to
k
n1+n2 bases of E1 unionsq E2; subsequently, ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2).
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have 
1
3
μ(E1) ≡ a and 
1
3
μ(E2) ≡ , hence the conjunction 
1
3
μ(E1) ∧
1
3
μ(E2) is consistent. We also have 
1
3
μ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡
, which does not entail 
1
3
μ(E1).
• (Maj): We want to show that ∃n ∈ N,kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | kμ(E2).
In order to simplify the proof, let us introduce the following notations:
kω1 = #({K | K ∈ E1 and ω | K }),
kω2 = #({K | K ∈ E2 and ω | K }),
n1 = #(E1),
n2 = #(E2).
We consider two cases:
(1) (
∧
E2) ∧ μ is consistent. Then there are two cases:
–
∧
(E1 unionsq E2)∧μ is consistent. Then kμ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡ (
∧
E1)∧ (∧ E2)∧μ and kμ(E2) | (∧ E2)∧μ. Hence the property
holds with n = 1.
–
∧
(E1 unionsq E2) ∧ μ is not consistent. Then for any n  1, ∧(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∧ μ is also not consistent. Reductio
ad absurdum: suppose that there is a world ω such that, for any integer n  0, ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) and ω |
kμ(E2). Then ω is a model of μ which satisﬁes a ratio greater or equal to k of bases of E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, and ω does
not satisfy (
∧
E2)∧μ. Hence ω is a model of (∨ E1) ∧μ and it is not a model of (∨ E2)∧μ (since ∧(E1 unionsq E2)∧μ
is not consistent). Subsequently ω satisﬁes exactly kω1 bases of E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
among the n1 + n × n2 bases of
this proﬁle, for any n >
kω1 −k×n1
k×n2 . So ω satisﬁes a ratio lower than k of bases of E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. Contradiction. So
kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | kμ(E2).
(2) (
∧
E2)∧μ is not consistent. Reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that there is a world ω such that, for any integer n 0,
ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) and ω | kμ(E2).
Since ω | kμ(E2), we have k
ω
2
n2
< k, so kω2 < k × n2; hence, we can note kω2 = k × n2 − 
ω2 for some 
ω2 > 0.
Since ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
), we also have
kω1 +n×kω2
n1+n×n2  k. Let nω be any integer  0 such that nω >
kω1

ω2
. Then:
kω1

ω2
− nω < 0, so kω1 − nω × 
ω2 < 0, hence k
ω
1 −nω×
ω2
n1+nω×n2 < 0. So we have
nω × k × n2
n1 + nω × n2 +
kω1 − nω × 
ω2
n1 + nω × n2 <
nω × k × n2
n1 + nω × n2
and, since n1 > 0:
nω × k × n2
n1 + nω × n2 <
nω × k × n2
nω × n2 =
k × n2
n2
= k.
So:
nω × k × n2 + kω1 − nω × 
ω2
n1 + nω × n2 =
kω1 + nω × kω2
n1 + nω × n2 < k.
Hence ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
nω
).
Furthermore, increasing further the number of copies of E2 in the proﬁle cannot enforce ω to satisfy the merged base:
∀n nω,ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸).n
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n
) and ω | kμ(E2), one can ﬁnd an integer
nω  0 such that ω | kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
nω
). To conclude the proof, it is suﬃcient to consider N = maxω∈W nω: for
every n N , we have kμ(E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | kμ(E2). 
Proof of Proposition 12. If
∧
E ∧ μ is consistent, then k+1μ (E) ≡ kμ(E) ≡
∧
E ∧ μ, and the property holds. If ∧ E ∧ μ is
inconsistent, then whenever an interpretation ω satisﬁes at least k+ 1 bases from E , it satisﬁes at least k elements from E ,
and the conclusion follows. 
Proof of Proposition 13. By deﬁnition, the models of dD ,Σμ (E) are exactly the models ω of μ minimizing dD(ω, E) =∑
K∈E dD(ω, K ). Since dD is drastic, the number of bases of E satisﬁed by ω is exactly #(E) − dD(ω, E), hence the minimal
value of dD(ω, E) when ω varies among the models of μ is equal to #(E)−kmax, and this shows that kmaxμ (E) ≡ dD ,Σμ (E).
Finally, the fact that dD ,Σμ = dD ,Gmaxμ (Theorem 4 from [18]) concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Since kmaxμ coincides with the IC merging operator dD ,Σμ (Proposition 13), the fact that it satisﬁes
(IC0)–(IC8) and (Maj) is a direct consequence of Theorem 2 from [19]. Now, the fact that it also satisﬁes (Disj) and (Card)
comes from Proposition 6 and the fact that kmaxμ can be associated to an equivalent quota merging operator (such a quota
merging operator is the one with k = kmax: while the prior computation of kmax is necessary to get a quota operator, its
unique impact concerns the computational aspects (but not the logical ones)). 
Proof of Lemma 2. The result directly follows from the fact that kmaxμ coincides with dD ,Σμ (Proposition 13), which can
be considered as the DA2 merging operator dD ,Max,Σμ , where each base consists of a single formula (see [16]). Theorem 3
from [16] completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma3. The result directly follows from the fact that kmaxμ coincides with dD ,Σμ (Proposition 13), and Theorem 2
from [12]. 
Proof of Proposition 14. Let us show that if ω and ω′ are two models of μ such that ω satisﬁes kmax bases from E and
ω′ satisﬁes k′ bases from E , with k′ < kmax, then dd,Gmin(ω, E) is strictly lower than dd,Gmin(ω′, E) with respect to the
lexicographic ordering lex . This is easy since (1) when ω satisﬁes kmax bases from E and d is a pseudo-distance, the kmax
ﬁrst coordinates of dd,Gmin(ω, E) are equal to 0, and (2) when ω′ satisﬁes strictly less bases from E and d is a pseudo-
distance, the kmax-th coordinate of dd,Gmin(ω′, E) is not equal to 0. 
Proof of Proposition 15. From Proposition 14, we know that dD ,Gminμ (E) | kmaxμ (E). So it remains to show that kmaxμ (E) |
dD ,Gminμ (E). Let us consider a model ω of kmaxμ (E), where E = {K1, . . . , Kn}.
First suppose that (
∨
E) ∧ μ is consistent. Then ω satisﬁes μ and a maximal number k of bases Ki (i.e., there
is no ω′ that satisﬁes more than k bases), and k is strictly greater than 0. Hence, the k ﬁrst elements of the list
ddD ,Gmin(ω, {K1, . . . , Kn}) are 0, and the n− k following ones are 1. Since this list is necessarily minimal with respect to the
lexicographic ordering among the lists induced by the models of μ and E (since for all other ω′ , ddD ,Gmin(ω′, {K1, . . . , Kn})
is a list of at most k 0s, followed by 1s), ω is a model of dD ,Gminμ (E). Subsequently, kmaxμ (E) | dD ,Gminμ (E).
Now, suppose that (
∨
E) ∧ μ is inconsistent. Then we have kmaxμ (E) ≡ μ, so for every model ω of μ and every base Ki
of E we have dD(ω, Ki) = 1. So for every model ω of μ, ddD ,Gmin(ω, E) is (1,1, . . . ,1), and dD ,Gminμ (E) ≡ μ ≡ kmaxμ (E). 
Proof of Proposition 16. In order to show that d,Gmin satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8) we ﬁrst show that the function which associates
to each proﬁle E the preorder d,GminE is a syncretic assignment, and conclude by Theorem 11 of [18]. Let us ﬁrst state two
useful lemmata:
Deﬁnition 13 (). Let v1 and v2 be two lists of integers. We note v1  v2 the list of integers obtained by sorting in
increasing order the concatenation of v1 and v2.
Lemma 5. Let v1, v ′1, v2, v ′2 be four lists of integers sorted in increasing order. If v1 lex v ′1 and v2 lex v ′2 , then v1 v2 lex v ′1 v ′2 .
Proof. Suppose that v1 lex v ′1 and v2 lex v ′2, it is easy to show that: v1  v2 lex v ′1  v2 and v ′1  v2 lex v ′1  v ′2. Then
by transitivity of lex , we get v1  v2 lex v ′1  v ′2. 
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(where <lex designed the strict relation associated to lex).
Proof. Under the assumptions of the lemma, it is easy to show that: v1  v2 lex v ′1  v2 and v ′1  v2 <lex v ′1  v ′2. Then by
transitivity of lex , we get v1  v2 <lex v ′1  v ′2. 
Now let us check the conditions of syncretic assignments:
1. If ω | E and ω′ | E , then ∀Ki ∈ E , ω | E and ω′ | E , so dd,Gmin(ω, E) = (0,0, . . . ,0) and dd,Gmin(ω′, E) = (0,0, . . . ,0),
so ω d,GminE ω′ .
2. If ω | E and ω′ | E , then dd,Gmin(ω, E) = (0,0, . . . ,0) and dd,Gmin(ω′, E) = (0,0, . . . ,0), so ω <d,GminE ω′ .
3. If E1 ≡ E2, then d,GminE1 =d,GminE2 .
4. We want to show that ∀ω | K ∃ω′ | K ′ such that ω′ d,Gmin{K ,K ′} ω. We have that d(ω, K ) = 0 and d(ω, K ′) =
minω′′|K ′ d(ω,ω′′). Consider any ω′ | K ′ such that d(ω,ω′) = d(ω, K ′). Then d(ω′, K ) =minω′′|K d(ω′,ω′′) d(ω′,ω),
and d(ω′, K ′) = 0. So dd,Gmin(ω′, {K , K ′})lex dd,Gmin(ω, {K , K ′}). So by deﬁnition ω′ d,Gmin{K ,K ′} ω.
5. We want to show that if dd,Gmin(ω, E1) lex dd,Gmin(ω′, E1) and dd,Gmin(ω, E2) lex dd,Gmin(ω′, E2), then
dd,Gmin(ω, {E1, E2})lex dd,Gmin(ω′, {E1, E2}). This is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.
6. We want to show that if dd,Gmin(ω, E1) <lex dd,Gmin(ω′, E1) and dd,Gmin(ω, E2) lex dd,Gmin(ω′, E2), then
dd,Gmin(ω, {E1, E2}) <lex dd,Gmin(ω′, {E1, E2}). This is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.
So the function is a syncretic assignment, and by Theorem 11 of [18] this shows that d,Gmin satisﬁes (IC0)–(IC8).
(Disj): Direct consequence of Proposition 14 since d,Gminμ (E) | kmaxμ (E).
(Card): Consider the following counter-example: P = {a,b}, E = {K1, K2, K3} with K1 = {¬a}, K2 = {a ∧ ¬b} and K3 =
{(¬a∧b)∨ (a∧¬b)}. maxcons(E) contains two elements: M1 = {¬a, (¬a∧b)∨ (a∧¬b)} and M2 = {a∧¬b, (¬a∧
b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)}. Clearly, #(M1) = #(M2). dH ,Gminμ (E) ≡ a∧ ¬b is consistent with M2 but not with M1.
(Wmaj) and (Maj): Consider the following counter-example: P = {a,b}, E1 = {a ∧ b}, E2 = {¬a ∧ ¬b} and μ ≡ b. Then, for
any n  1, d,Gminμ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) has a single model ω = (a = 1;b = 1) (the ﬁrst element of dd,Gmin(ω, E1 unionsq
E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) is 0, so the distance is minimal, and ω is the only world in this case). So d,Gminμ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)
is not consistent with d,Gminμ (E2) which single model is ω′ = (a = 0,b = 1). Hence (Wmaj) (and then (Maj)) is
not satisﬁed. 
Proof of Proposition 17. If
∨
E2 is consistent with the constraint μ, then for any n > #(E1), no model of E1 which is not
a model of E2 can be in [d,Gminμ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)] because the list dd,Gmin(ω, E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) contains at least n zero
when ω is a model of d,Gminμ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
). Hence ∃n ∈ N,d,Gminμ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq · · · unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) | d,Gminμ (E2). 
Proof of Proposition 18.
• d,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip if every base from the proﬁle E is complete (i.e., each base has a unique model).
We ﬁrst show that if a merging operator d,Gminμ is not strategy-proof for ip , then it is not strategy-proof by erosion
(i.e., when a manipulation is possible by reporting a base which entails the actual one). Clearly, no such manipulation
is possible when each base from the proﬁle is complete, so we can conclude that d,Gminμ is not strategy-proof for
ip , hence for the two other indexes as well (d,Gminμ satisﬁes (IC1)). Reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that there exists a
proﬁle E = {K2, . . . , Kn}, an integrity constraint μ and two bases K and K ′ with K ′ | K , such that
ip
(
K ,d,Gminμ
({K } unionsq E))< ip(K ,d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)).
Equivalently:
#([K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K } unionsq E)])
#([d,Gminμ ({K } unionsq E)])
<
#([K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)])
#([d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)])
.
We deﬁne K ′′ by [K ′′] = [K ∧ K ′ ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)]. We show in the rest of the proof that a manipulation can be
achieved by reporting K ′′ instead of K (hence a manipulation by erosion since K ′′ | K ).
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K ∧d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E). Since ω is a model of d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E), ω satisﬁes μ and a maximal number of bases of {K ′} unionsq E ,
say k bases. Since ω | K ′ , ω satisﬁes k bases of E . So, ω satisﬁes k + 1 bases of {K } unionsq E . Suppose that ∃ω′ | K such
that ω′ | d,Gminμ ({K } unionsq E). Then ω′ satisﬁes μ and satisﬁes at least k+ 1 bases of {K } unionsq E . Since ω′ | K , ω satisﬁes at
least k+ 1 bases of E , so at least k+ 1 bases of {K ′} unionsq E . This contradicts the fact that ω is a model of d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)
by satisfying a maximal number k of bases of {K ′} unionsq E . So every model of d,Gminμ ({K } unionsq E) is a model of K , and
ip(K ,d,Gminμ ({K } unionsq E)) = 1 is maximal, which contradicts the assumption.
2. Second, we have [K ′′] = ∅, since otherwise there would be no model of K in d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E), which contradicts the
manipulability of E for K ′ .
3. Let us now consider a model ω1 of K ∧ K ′ ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E). In order to simplify the notations, we note d instead
of dd,Gmin in this proof. We have ω1 | μ and d(ω1, {K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}) = d(ω1, {K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}), because d(ω1, K ′′) =
d(ω1, K ′) = 0. Moreover:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
So:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex), (A.5)
and
min
({
d
(
ω,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex)
min
({
d
(
ω,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
Besides, since K ′′ | K ′ , we have that ∀ω ∈ W,d(ω, K ′)  d(ω, K ′′). So ∀ω ∈ W , d(ω, {K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}) lex
d(ω, {K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}), and
min
({(
ω,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex)
min
({(
ω,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
With (A.5), we get:
min
({
d
(
ω,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex)
=min({d(ω,{K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex). (A.6)
4. Consider now a model ω1 of K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E). We have ω1 | μ and ω1 | K ′ from point 1. of the proof. Then
ω1 | K ′′ , and since d(ω1, K ′) = d(ω1, K ′′) = 0, we have d(ω1, {K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}) = d(ω1, {K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}). Furthermore,
since:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex),
(A.6) gives that:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
So ω1 is a model of d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E) and we have:
#
([
K ∧ d,Gminμ
({
K ′
} unionsq E)]) #([K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)]).
5. Finally, if we consider ω1 | ¬K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E), then ω1 | μ and:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
Since K ′′ | K ′ , we have that d(ω1, K ′) d(ω1, K ′′). So we get:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})
lex d
(
ω1,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
})
.
Hence:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})
lex min
({
d
(
ω,
{
K ′′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
From (A.6), we get:
d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})
lex min
({
d
(
ω,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex).
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d
(
ω1,
{
K ′, K2, . . . , Kn
})=min({d(ω,{K ′, K2, . . . , Kn}) ∣∣ω | μ},lex)
and ω1 is a model of d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E) and:
#
([¬K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)]) #([¬K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)]).
Then,
#([K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)])
#([d,Gminμ ({K ′} unionsq E)])

#([K ∧ d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)])
#([d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)])
.
So,
ip
(
K ,d,Gminμ
({
K ′
} unionsq E)) ip(K ,d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)).
And ﬁnally,
ip
(
K ,d,Gminμ
({K } unionsq E))< ip(K ,d,Gminμ ({K ′′} unionsq E)),
which concludes the proof.
• d,Gmin is strategy-proof for the indexes idw and ids if every base from the proﬁle E is complete, or if #(E) = 2 and
μ ≡ .
We know that a merging operator satisfying (IC1) and strategy-proof for i p is also strategy-proof for the drastic indexes
idw and ids . Here, with the ﬁrst point of the proof, we know that d,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip if every base of the proﬁle
is complete, and then the result for idw and ids follows (d,Gmin satisﬁes (IC1)).
The second case is when #(E) = 2 and μ ≡ . The result under these assumptions is a direct consequence of the
following lemma:
Lemma 7. d,Gmin ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 is consistent.
Proof. Reductio ad absurdum. Let us suppose that d,Gmin ({K1, K2}) is inconsistent with K1. We have that:
∃ω′ | ¬K1, ∀ω | K1, d
(
ω, {K1, K2}
)
>lex d
(
ω′, {K1, K2}
)
.
Since ∀ω | K1,d(ω, K1) = 0, we get:
∃ω′ | ¬K1, ∀ω | K1,
(
0,d(ω, K2)
)
>lex dd,Gmin
(
ω′, {K1, K2}
)
. (A.7)
As ω′ | ¬K1, we have d(ω′, K1) = 0; hence for Inequation (A.7) to hold we must have d(ω′, K2) = 0. So
∃ω′ | ¬K1, ∀ω | K1,
(
0,d(ω, K2)
)
>lex
(
0,d
(
ω′, K1
))
.
In particular, if we consider ω1 | K1 such that d(ω′, K1) = d(ω′,ω1), we get:(
0,d(ω1, K2)
)
>lex
(
0,d
(
ω′,ω1
))
.
This requires that d(ω1, K2) > d(ω′,ω1) with ω′ | K2, but this is impossible. Contradiction. 
Let us now prove the main proposition:
idw : Since d,Gmin ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 is consistent (Lemma 7), we always have idw (K1,d,Gmin ({K1, K2})) = 1, so no manipula-
tion is possible (idw is maximal).
ids : Reductio ad absurdum. If d,Gmin is not strategy-proof, then we can ﬁnd K ′1 such that ids (K1,d,Gmin ({K1, K2})) <
ids (K1,d,Gmin ({K ′1, K2})). For the strong drastic index, this means exactly that ids (K1,d,Gmin ({K1, K2})) = 0 and
ids (K1, d,Gmin ({K ′1, K2})) = 1. So we have:
d,Gmin
({K1, K2}) | K1, (A.8)
d,Gmin
({
K ′1, K2
}) | K1. (A.9)
Since d,Gmin ({K ′1, K2}) ∧ K2 is consistent (Lemma 7), we can ﬁnd ω2 | K2 such that ω2 | d,Gmin ({K ′1, K2}). With
(A.9), we can conclude that ω2 | K1 as well.
Since ω2 | K1 ∧ K2, then d(ω2, {K1, K2}) = (0,0). So for every model ω of d,Gmin ({K1, K2}), we have d(ω, {K1, K2}) =
(0,0). This implies that d,Gmin({K1, K2}) ≡ K1 ∧ K2. This contradicts (A.8), so no manipulation is possible. 
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• dD ,Gmin is strategy-proof for the three indexes idw , ip and ids . This is a consequence of Proposition 15 (dD ,Gmin =
kmax ) and Proposition 3 (kmax is strategy-proof for the three indexes).
• dH ,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip if and only if every base from the proﬁle E is complete.
– If every base from the proﬁle E is complete, from Proposition 18, it comes that dH ,Gmin is strategy-proof for ip .
– As to the converse, the following example shows that dH ,Gminμ is not strategy-proof for ip , even when μ =  and
two bases are to be merged. Let us consider [K1] = {0000,0111,1011,1101,1110}, [K2] = {1000,0100,0010,0001},
and μ = . Then [dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2})] = {0000,0001,0010,0100,1000}, and ip(K1,dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2})) = 15 .
If agent 1 gives K ′1 with [K ′1] = {0111,1011,1101,1110} instead of K1, then [dH ,Gmin ({K ′1, K2})] = {0001,0010,0100,
0111,1000,1011,1101,1110} and ip(K1,dH ,Gmin ({K ′1, K2})) = 12 , showing the manipulability.
• dH ,Gminμ is strategy-proof for idw and ids if and only if every base from the proﬁle E is complete, or if #(E) = 2 and
μ ≡ .
– If every base from the proﬁle E is complete or if #(E) = 2 and μ ≡ , from Proposition 18, it comes that dH ,Gmin is
strategy-proof for the drastic indexes idw and ids .
– As to the converse, by case analysis:
idw : Suppose that μ ≡  and #(E) = 2. Then consider P = {a,b}, [K1] = {00,01}, [K2] = {11}, and μ = a ∨ ¬b. We
have [dH ,Gminμ ({K1, K2})] = {11}, and idw (K1,dH ,Gminμ ({K1, K2})) = 0. If agent 1 gives [K ′1] = {00} instead of K1,
then [dH ,Gminμ ({K ′1, K2})] = {00,11} and we have idw (K1,dH ,Gminμ ({K ′1, K2})) = 1.
Suppose now that μ ≡  and #(E) = 2. Then consider [K1] = {000,001}, [K2] = {100,111}, [K3] = {011}
and μ = . We obtain [dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2, K3})] = {011}, and idw (K1,dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2, K3})) = 0. If agent 1
gives K ′1 with [K ′1] = {000} instead of K1, then [dH ,Gmin ({K ′1, K2, K3})] = {000,011} and idw (K1,dH ,Gmin
({K ′1, K2, K3})) = 1.
ids : Suppose that μ ≡  and #(E) = 2, and consider P = {a,b, c}, [K1] = {000,011}, [K2] = {001,111}, and μ =
a ∨ b ∨ ¬c. Then [dH ,Gminμ ({K1, K2})] = {000,011,111}, and ids (K1,dH ,Gminμ ({K1, K2})) = 0. If agent 1 gives
[K ′1] = {000} instead of K1, then [dH ,Gminμ ({K ′1, K2})] = {000} and ids (K1,dH ,Gminμ ({K ′1, K2})) = 1.
Finally, suppose μ ≡  and #(E) = 2; consider [K1] = {000,011}, [K2] = {000,111}, [K3] = {001,111} and
μ = . We have [dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2, K3})] = {000,111}, and ids (K1,dH ,Gmin ({K1, K2, K3})) = 0. If agent 1 gives
K ′1 with [K ′1] = {000} instead of K1, then the result is [dH ,Gmin ({K ′1, K2, K3})] = {000} and ids (K1,dH ,Gmin
({K ′1, K2, K3})) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 20. Immediate from Theorem 2(1) from [16] and the fact that each d,Gmin operator coincides with
the DA2 merging operator d,Max,Gmin , where each base consists of a single formula. 
Proof of Proposition 21.
• Immediate from Proposition 2 and Proposition 15.
• Membership comes directly from Proposition 20. As to hardness, we consider the following polynomial reduction f
from max-sat-asgodd to merge(dH ,Gmin). Let Σ be a propositional formula such that Var(Σ) = {x1, . . . , xn}. Let
f (Σ) =
〈
E =
{
Ki =
{
xi ∧
2(i−1)∧
j=1
new j
} ∣∣∣ i ∈ 1, . . . ,n}, μ = Σ ∧ 2(n−1)∧
j=1
¬new j, α = xn
〉
where each newj ( j ∈ 1, . . . ,2n− 2) is a new variable (not occurring in Σ ). Now, for every model ω of μ and for every
i ∈ 1, . . . ,n− 1, we have
dH (ω, Ki) < dH (ω, Ki+1).
This shows that the lists ddH ,Gmin(ω, E) obtained by sorting the set {dH (ω, Ki) | i ∈ 1, . . . ,n} in increasing order are
always sorted in the same way (independently of ω): the ﬁrst element is dH (ω, K1), the second one is dH (ω, K2), etc.
Furthermore, whenever a model ω1 of μ is strictly lower than a model ω2 of μ with respect to the lexicographic
ordering  induced by x1 < x2 < · · · < xn , then ddH ,Gmin(ω1, E) is strictly greater than ddH ,Gmin(ω2, E) (with respect to
lex). Since the models of μ are totally ordered with respect to , exactly one model of μ is minimal with respect to
the preference ordering induced by E: this is the model of μ that is maximal with respect to . Accordingly, xn is true
in this model if and only if dH ,Gminμ (E) | α holds. This concludes the proof. 
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merging operator, denoted ̂k, is deﬁned in a model-theoretic way as:
[̂kμ(E)]=
{ {ω ∈ [μ] | ∀Ki ∈ Eω | Ki} if non-empty, else
{ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} if non-empty, else
{ω ∈ [μ]}.
̂k operators satisfy (IC0), (IC1), (IC2), (IC3), (IC4), (IC7) and (IC8). They do not satisfy (IC5), (IC6), (Disj) and (Maj) in the general
case.
Proof.
(IC0), (IC1), (IC2), (IC3) Obvious from the deﬁnition of ̂k .
(IC4) We have to show that if K1 | μ, K2 | μ, and ̂kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1 | ⊥, then ̂kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 | ⊥.
Let E = {K1, K2}. Assume that K1 | μ and K2 | μ. If K1 ∧ K2 ∧ μ is consistent or {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})
k} is not empty, then the deﬁnition of ̂k is the same as the one of k , so from Proposition 6, (IC4) holds. In
the remaining case, i.e., if K1 ∧ K2 ∧ μ is not consistent and {ω ∈ [μ] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})  k} is empty, then
̂kμ({K1, K2}) ≡ μ. In this case, as K2 | μ, ̂kμ({K1, K2}) ∧ K2 is consistent and (IC4) is satisﬁed.
(IC5) If k = 2 and E1 = {K1}, E2 = {K2}, then we have ̂2μ(E1) = ̂2μ(E2) ≡ μ. But ̂2μ(E1 unionsq E2) ≡ K1 ∧ K2 ∧μ if consistent,
and ̂2μ(E1) ∧ ̂2μ(E2) ≡ μ | K1 ∧ K2 ∧ μ.
(IC6) The counter-example used in Proposition 6 to show that k dos not satisfy (IC6) still applies here.
(IC7) We have to show that ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | ̂kμ1∧μ2 (E).
If
∧
E ∧ μ1 is consistent or {ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is not empty, then the deﬁnition of ̂k is the same
as the one of k , so from Proposition 6, (IC7) holds. In the remaining case, i.e., if ∧ E ∧ μ1 is not consistent and
{ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is empty, then ̂kμ1 (E) ≡ μ1. In this case, ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 ≡ μ1 ∧ μ2. As
∧
E ∧ μ1
is not consistent,
∧
E ∧ (μ1 ∧ μ2) is not consistent as well.
Now, since {ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})  k} is empty, there is no model ω of μ1 ∧ μ2 such that #({Ki ∈ E |
ω | Ki}) k so {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is also empty.
Therefore ̂kμ1∧μ2 (E) ≡ μ1 ∧ μ2 and ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 | ̂kμ1∧μ2 (E), showing that (IC7) is satisﬁed.
(IC8) We have to show that if ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 is consistent, then ̂kμ1∧μ2 (E) | ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2. We consider two cases:
(1) μ1 ∧μ2 ∧∧ E is consistent. Then μ1 ∧∧ E is consistent as well and we have ̂kμ1∧μ2 (E) ≡ μ1 ∧μ2 ∧∧ E . Hence
̂kμ1∧μ2 (E) | ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2, and (IC8) is satisﬁed.
(2) μ1 ∧ μ2 ∧∧ E is inconsistent. In this situation, two cases are possible:
• {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is not empty.
Then [̂kμ1∧μ2 (E)] = {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}.
Suppose that μ1 ∧∧ E is consistent. Then ̂kμ1 (E) ≡ μ1 ∧∧ E . As μ1 ∧ μ2 ∧∧ E is inconsistent, we deduce that
̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 is also inconsistent, which contradicts the assumption. So μ1 ∧
∧
E is inconsistent.
As {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})  k} ⊆ {ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki})  k}, we know that {ω ∈ [μ1] |
#({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is not empty. Since [̂kμ1 (E)] = {ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k}, we have:
̂kμ1∧μ2(E) | ̂kμ1(E) ∧ μ2
and (IC8) holds.
• {ω ∈ [μ1 ∧ μ2] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} is empty.
Then [̂kμ1∧μ2 (E)] = [μ1 ∧ μ2]. By assumption, ̂kμ1 (E) ∧ μ2 is consistent, so we can deduce that ̂kμ1 (E) ≡ μ1 ∧∧
E and [̂kμ1 (E)] = {ω ∈ [μ1] | #({Ki ∈ E | ω | Ki}) k} = ∅. This shows that ̂kμ1 (E) ≡ μ1.
Obviously,
̂kμ1∧μ2(E) | ̂kμ1(E) ∧ μ2
and (IC8) holds also in this case.
(Disj) Consider the following counter-example: P = {a,b}, E = {K1, K2} with K1 = {a}, K2 = {b}, k = 2, μ = ¬a. We have
̂kμ(E) ≡ ¬a. Clearly, while
∨
E is consistent with μ, we do not have ̂kμ(E) |
∨
E .
(Maj) Consider the same counter-example as the one given in the same item of the proof of Proposition 6. 
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